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Comment
LONG LIVE THE KING: THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA’S KING’S BENCH POWERS RIGHTFULLY
CROWN IT AS KING OF THE
COMMONWEALTH’S JUDICIARY
MICHAEL J. SCHWAB*
“But, the availability of the power is essential to a well-functioning
judicial system; and it appears that this is a point that is difficult
to fully appreciate without having served on the Court.”1
I. THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA’S KING’S BENCH POWERS KEEP
BALANCE IN THE COMMONWEALTH’S JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE
The king of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s judiciary is the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.2 Being the head of the commonwealth’s
judiciary results in unique functions and responsibilities.3 One of these
capabilities is a grant of power originating from early English law—King’s
Bench.4
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S. 2018, Lehigh University. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Jolyne
and Tony Schwab, and my brother, Anthony Schwab, for their continued support
and encouragement throughout my studies. I will always be grateful for my family
providing me the opportunity to achieve my goals in and out of the classroom. I
would also like to thank the members of the Villanova Law Review who assisted me
throughout the writing process.
1. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 670 (Pa. 2014) (discussing Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania’s capability to exercise King’s Bench jurisdiction to cure injustices in
the judiciary while using powers cautiously). For a discussion of In re Bruno and
the supreme court’s analysis of King’s Bench powers, see infra Section III.A.
2. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 2 (declaring Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as
highest and most powerful court).
3. See Sean Mahoney & Ciaran Way, King’s Bench Petition Seeks to Consolidate All
Pennsylvania COVID-19 Business Interruption Insurance Cases, JDSUPRA (May 5, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/king-s-bench-petition-seeks-to-22336/
[https://perma.cc/4BWA-Q3GH] (discussing rare forms of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction, such as extraordinary jurisdiction and King’s Bench, in
context of global pandemic response in commonwealth’s judiciary). The court
holds the ability to assume jurisdiction whether a matter is pending or not using
either extraordinary jurisdiction or King’s Bench powers. See infra Sections II.A, C.
4. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 502 (1976) (granting supreme court King’s Bench
powers). The text with regards to King’s Bench powers states:
The Supreme Court shall have and exercise the powers vested in it by the
Constitution of Pennsylvania, including the power generally to minister justice
to all persons and to exercise the powers of the court, as fully and amply, to all
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King’s Bench is a rarely discussed form of jurisdiction the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania possesses, which allows the court to select and hear
any issue at any stage in the commonwealth’s court proceedings.5 King’s
Bench not only enables the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to exercise a
broad range of oversight powers over other judicial bodies, but it also
grants the court the ability to select, hear, and resolve issues proceeding
through lower courts.6 While states like Colorado, Delaware, Florida, New
York, and New Jersey have briefly commented on the powers of the English King’s Bench, those courts have not comparably used them like the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.7
The court utilizes King’s Bench sparingly and only for issues requiring
timely intervention to cure injustice; this is comparable to its ability to
invoke extraordinary jurisdiction, another form of jurisdiction allowing
the court to adjudicate high-stakes issues.8 For example, the court invoked King’s Bench to remedy the unprecedented corruption resulting
intents and purposes, as the justices of the Court of King’s Bench, Common Pleas
and Exchequer, at Westminster, or any of them, could or might do on May 22,
1722.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. See Max Mitchell, In Freeing Meek Mill, Pa. Justices Flexed Rarely Used King’s
Bench Muscle, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.lambmcerlane.
com/articles/in-freeing-meek-mill-pa-justices-flexed-rarely-used-kings-bench-mus
cle/ [https://perma.cc/33V8-E6WE] (outlining King’s Bench powers). For a discussion of how broadly King’s Bench powers can range over different issues, see
infra Section III.A.
6. See, e.g., Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 61 A.2d 426, 428 (Pa.
1948) (commenting on breadth of King’s Bench powers over inferior courts in
Commonwealth). The supreme court in Carpentertown believed the King’s Bench
powers to be “high and transcendent,” and kept all lower tribunals within the
Court’s oversight. Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *37, *42);
see also Alexandra Makosky, Comment, The King’s Bench Power in Pennsylvania: A
Unique Power That Provides Efficient Results King’s Bench Power in Pennsylvania, 101
DICK. L. REV. 671, 677–78 (1997) (explaining how supreme court views King’s
Bench powers and ability to oversee lower tribunals as an efficient use of judicial
resources). The supreme court has the power “to prescribe general rules governing practice procedure and the conduct of all courts.” Makosky, supra, at 677
(quoting In re 24 Pa. C.S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 447 (Pa. 1978)).
7. See Bernard F. Sherer, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Origins of
King’s Bench Power, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 525, 535 n.67 (listing examples of other states’
discussions of King’s Bench powers). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has expanded the powers as a supervisory tool as time has progressed. See infra Part III
(highlighting various cases supreme court has used King’s Bench in, as well as
other controversies).
8. Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 726 (1976) (amended 2004) (describing supreme court’s extraordinary jurisdiction powers and ability to hear issues of public
importance only if issues are pending in lower courts), with § 502 (explaining supreme court’s King’s Bench capabilities). See also 1 WEST’S PA. FORMS, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1:5, Westlaw (database updated July 2019) (juxtaposing King’s Bench and
extraordinary jurisdiction). “Although in many respects . . . King’s Bench powers
is to the same effect as . . . extraordinary jurisdiction . . . the two are not identical.”
WEST’S PA. FORMS, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra. For a further discussion of the differences between King’s Bench and extraordinary jurisdiction, see infra Section II.C.
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from the 2008 “Kids for Cash” scandal.9 The scandal occurred when two
judges accepted payments to fill a correctional facility and subsequently
deprived thousands of juveniles access to fair adjudications.10
King’s Bench powers and extraordinary jurisdiction are distinct and
both used infrequently.11 Even if a party suffers a clear violation of rights,
relief is not guaranteed under either form of jurisdiction.12 The main
difference between the two is that King’s Bench does not require a matter
to be pending in a lower court for the supreme court to hear the case.13
This means, hypothetically, the court can use King’s Bench to insert itself
in matters where parties have yet to litigate in a lower court.14
The supreme court has selectively granted King’s Bench petitions and
has denied more petitions than it has allowed.15 The court has opted to
use its King’s Bench powers when an issue rises to a level of public importance such that the court must step in and adjudicate.16 Notably, the
court relied on its King’s Bench authority in granting famous rapper Meek
Mill’s bail request.17 This exemplifies the court’s receptiveness to use ancient powers in modern-day situations—especially when the judiciary’s integrity is called into question.18 As recently as 2020, the court exercised its
9. See infra Section III.B (discussing “Kids for Cash” scandal).
10. For an analysis of the “Kids for Cash” scandal and how the court used its
King’s Bench powers to remedy the issue, see infra Section III.B.
11. See 1 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 2:146, Westlaw (database updated March 2020) (explaining supreme court’s ability to cautiously invoke plenary jurisdiction); see also In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 696–97 (Pa. 2014) (Saylor, J.,
concurring) (stating King’s Bench is reserved for only most unique and “extraordinary” situations). Justice Saylor reiterated this to prove there are other availabilities for remedying issues, and the supreme court does not always need to rely on
King’s Bench. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 696–97 (Saylor, J., concurring).
12. See STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, supra note 11 (detailing supreme
court’s extraordinary jurisdiction is limited to circumstances where “the record
clearly demonstrates the petitioner’s rights,” and noting even this showing would
not entitle petitioner to relief).
13. 1 WEST’S PA. FORMS, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1:5, Westlaw (database updated
July 2019) (noting King’s Bench enables the court to hear a case at any stage in
litigation).
14. See id.; Mahoney & Way, supra note 3 (highlighting court’s ability to hear
matters not pending using King’s Bench).
15. Mitchell, supra note 5 (noting over two-year period the court denied fiftyseven petitions for King’s Bench review and granted only two). Review of rulings
for whether to exercise King’s Bench are available publicly on the supreme court’s
administrative website. See id.
16. See, e.g., infra Section III.D (discussing Mumia Abu-Jamal case court exercised King’s Bench for).
17. See Mitchell, supra note 5 (discussing court’s use of King’s Bench powers
in rapper Meek Mill’s legal case due to public’s growing scrutiny and calls for criminal justice reform).
18. See id. (“[Meek Mill] also cited newly revealed evidence in his case, and
relied heavily on references to Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge Genece
Brinkley’s handling of the case, saying she often took a prosecutorial stance in the
case and at times took an unusually personal interest, given [Meek Mill’s] fame.”);
see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199, 1206–07 (Pa. 2015) (explain-
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King’s Bench authority to appoint a special master to review Philadelphia
District Attorney Larry Krasner’s role in famous death row activist and former Black Panther Mumia Abu-Jamal’s case.19
Some critics have suggested stripping the powers from the court.20
They have stated its use is a form of judicial activism, thus, granting the
court the ability to circumvent normal procedure and delegitimize standard appellate processes.21 For example, in 2020, high-profile litigants requested King’s Bench relief to avoid adverse holdings they expected from
typical procedural processes in some of the most controversial matters in
the judiciary.22
This Comment argues King’s Bench remains an efficient mechanism
that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania should continue using to cure
judiciary defects, resolve injustices, and oversee lower tribunals.23 King’s
Bench powers have stood the test of time and have been preserved in the
ing court’s decision to uphold Governor Wolf’s reprieve for a death row inmate
despite concerns governor encroached on judiciary’s role to determine final judgment of case); see also In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 671–72 (Pa. 2014) (discussing
flexibility used in recent years with King’s Bench powers over “Kids for Cash” scandal); Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hurtz, Selling Kids Short: How “Rights For Kids”
Turned Into “Kids For Cash”, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 653, 656 (2016) (explaining King’s
Bench history in “Kids for Cash” scandal and highlighting initial petition to supreme court).
19. See Zack Needles, Justices Tap Go-to Special Master to Probe Krasner’s Office for
Alleged Conflicts in Abu-Jamal Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 3, 2020, 4:11 PM),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2020/03/03/justices-tap-go-to-specialmaster-to-probe-krasners-office-for-alleged-conflicts-in-abu-jamal-case/ [permalink
unavailable] (noting concerns District Attorney Krasner and staff may be conflicted out for prior work done in support of Abu-Jamal).
20. See Bruce Ledewitz, What’s Really Wrong with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 409, 411–12 (1994) (arguing rewriting of article V of the
Pennsylvania constitution did not curtail King’s Bench powers and is not unconstitutional because article V defines the supreme court’s jurisdiction in the first
place); see also Sherer, supra note 7, at 533–34 (discussing former Delegate Mattioni’s argument that general assembly has ability to remove King’s Bench power
according to article II of Pennsylvania constitution). For further discussion of
those critical of the supreme court’s King’s Bench powers and the ability for the
general assembly to potentially revoke them, see infra Section II.B.
21. See Ledewitz, supra note 20, at 411–12 (advocating powers beyond what is
prescribed by Pennsylvania constitution are altogether unconstitutional); see also
Makosky, supra note 6, at 679–80 (opining about legislature’s view of King’s Bench
powers). Even though some legislatures believe King’s Bench is an encroachment
on the legislature’s ability to serve the commonwealth, commentators have suggested the legislature itself cannot fully comprehend the power of King’s Bench.
See Makosky, supra note 6, at 679.
22. For a discussion of the most recent controversy surrounding King’s Bench
and the capital punishment system, see infra Section III.C.
23. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Honorable Cappy: Distinguished Keeper of the
King’s Bench Jurisdiction, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 481, 486 (2009) (discussing enduring powers of King’s Bench jurisdiction and supreme court’s duty to utilize them to benefit
people of the commonwealth); Makosky, supra note 6, at 695–96 (arguing Pennsylvania’s ability to bring cases swiftly before supreme court can correct injustices
and expedite appellate process when necessary).
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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s constitution—a constitution predating
that of the United States.24 If King’s Bench did not exist, the Pennsylvania
judiciary would be without an effective last resort remedy.25 The Pennsylvania legislature should recognize that King’s Bench is a beneficial avenue to resolve judicial issues even if the legislature believes the powers are
not vested.26 In applying King’s Bench, the supreme court should adhere
to the original purpose of the power by maintaining selectivity in accepting petitions, providing deference to other judicial bodies, and allowing lower courts to serve as fact finders.27 Situations like the Abu-Jamal
appeal, the “Kids for Cash” scandal, and the Meek Mill trial support the
argument that the court should continue using King’s Bench given the
proper circumstances.28
Part II of this Comment provides a background of King’s Bench, its
origins in the Pennsylvania constitution, early cases involving King’s
Bench, the legislature’s attempt to eliminate the powers, and differences
between King’s Bench and other versions of supreme court jurisdiction.
Part III discusses recent supreme court decisions and situations where the
court decided whether to exercise King’s Bench. Part IV provides a critical analysis of King’s Bench and argues the Pennsylvania legislature and
judiciary should preserve this historically effective grant of power. It also
argues the court properly exercised King’s Bench in Mumia Abu-Jamal’s
death row appeal because it delegated fact-finding responsibilities to a different judicial body. Part V discusses the future impact of King’s Bench in
Pennsylvania.
II. THE EARLIEST KINGS

OF THE

BENCH

Since the eleventh century, the King of England personally selected
officers to participate on the King’s Bench to represent the king in legal
24. See Aldisert, supra note 23, at 485–86 (recognizing superintendency power
of King’s Bench over inferior tribunals dating back to early English law); see also
Sherer, supra note 7, at 535–36 (recognizing other states’ discussions of power similar to King’s Bench, but acknowledging its specific advancements and functions
within the Commonwealth). The Judiciary Act of 1722 created the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, thus, its powers predated that of the United States Supreme
Court’s set forth in the United States Constitution. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 2. For a
further discussion of the Pennsylvania legislature’s adoption of King’s Bench jurisdiction and origins from English law, see infra Section II.A.
25. See Makosky, supra note 6, at 700 (hypothesizing if King’s Bench were to
be eliminated or limited, then supreme court would not be able to expedite addressing important issues). Proponents of King’s Bench argue for the preservation
of the power, even though there are delegates in Pennsylvania that also seek large
judicial reform. See id. at 696.
26. For an analysis on the inherent nature, or lack thereof, for King’s Bench,
see infra Part IV.
27. For an explanation on why the supreme court should carefully select issues to use King’s Bench powers, see infra Part IV.
28. See infra Section IV.D.
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affairs.29 Resolution of legal matters changed after the Magna Carta reduced the amount of power the King of England could possess by ensuring everyone, including the King of England, must abide by the law.30
Because the Magna Carta minimized the Bench’s originally extensive powers, the Bench divided into two different divisions—one overseeing matters involving the King and any criminal cases, and the other overseeing
improprieties in lower tribunals.31
Early English law gave the Bench authority to try cases with a jury or
remand cases to other counties for trial.32 The King’s Bench powers gave
supervisory authority to its members, but the House of Peers of England
remained the court of last resort in early English law.33 Thus, even after a
decision by the King’s Bench, a losing party had the ability to appeal to a
higher tribunal.34 The English judiciary officers designed their appellate
court system with the King’s Bench being solely responsible for appeals
from lower tribunals.35 Therefore, even though the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania is viewed as the court of last resort when exercising King’s
Bench, the English judiciary did not make the original King’s Bench of
England the most powerful court in England.36
29. See Commonwealth v. Balph, 3 A. 220, 225 (Pa. 1886) (examining how
former kings of England sat among King’s Bench to hear arraignments of cases,
but that kings never took part in decisions). To protect the crown, the king nominated members to King’s Bench and attended some proceedings, but only to signify the importance of the Bench by appearing. See id. The members of the King’s
Bench assembled to give advice to the king. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 526 (tracking origins of King’s Bench and its original purpose dating back to eleventh century’s William of Normandy).
30. See Magna Carta, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (defining Magna Carta as King John’s earliest adoption of guarantees for
individual rights and privileges).
31. See Commonwealth v. Ickhoff, 33 Pa. 80, 81 (1859) (commenting on
Pennsylvania King’s Bench authority to remove a criminal case using certiorari
from any lower court stemming from English King’s Bench); Sherer, supra note 7,
at 526–27 (stating the King’s Bench had superintendency power over the Chancery, Common Pleas, and Exchequer courts of England).
32. See Balph, 3 A. 220 at 226 (explaining numerous texts and decisions accurately defined King’s Bench as it existed in England). While the Balph decision
stated the scope and power of the King’s Bench is settled, its limitations have been
subject to major dispute in Pennsylvania law well after the court decided the case.
See, e.g., In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 670 (Pa. 2014) (highlighting when court typically calls on King’s Bench powers).
33. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 527–28 (claiming King’s Bench was subject to
review by House of Peers of England, “the court of final recourse”).
34. See id. at 527 (“[T]he House of Peers became the court of final
recourse.”).
35. See id. at 526 (analyzing court of England’s redistribution of judicial power
after enactment of Magna Carta); id. at 526 n.11 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, *37, *39–40) (discussing how judicial officers sought to form
checks on each other by designating different subject matters for different courts).
36. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199, 1206 (stating King’s Bench
is viewed as court of last resort allowing deviance from normal procedures).
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The structure of the English judiciary impacted how early lawmakers
modeled the Pennsylvania judiciary. For example, the commonwealth
granted the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania similar powers as the original
English King’s Bench.37 Parties seeking judicial recourse in Pennsylvania
immediately challenged the extent of the court’s King’s Bench powers in a
variety of matters.38 Over time, the court subsumed even greater jurisdiction using King’s Bench.39 Legislators and commentators suggested alterations to the way King’s Bench operates when the court began expanding
the powers’ reach.40 Though the court’s King’s Bench authority has
stayed the same, Pennsylvania provides other statutory ways for the court
to exercise plenary jurisdiction.41 These additional versions of jurisdiction
serve a similar purpose as King’s Bench, most notably, extraordinary jurisdiction.42 Both are little known but effective ways for last resort parties to
seek relief.
A. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s Early King’s Bench History
In 1722, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, and with it, King’s Bench.43 Title 42, section 502 of
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, which grants the court King’s
Bench powers, states that the supreme court has powers “as the justices of
the Court of King’s Bench . . . might do on May 22, 1722.”44 Before the
American Revolution, the House of Peers of England’s jurisdiction still
superseded that of the supreme court.45 After the Revolutionary War, the
Pennsylvania general assembly created a High Court of Errors and Appeals
with the intent to mimic the English House of Peers with its own similar
version.46 The Pennsylvania Court of Errors and Appeals quickly dis37. For information about the initial intent of King’s Bench enactment in
Pennsylvania, see infra Section II.A.
38. For an analysis of early challenges to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
King’s Bench powers, see infra Section II.A.
39. For further discussion of cases where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
subsumed greater power using King’s Bench, see infra Section II.A.
40. For a discussion of later developments of King’s Bench authority, including those disapproving of its extent, see infra Section II.B.
41. For information about another judicial function designed to cure defects
within the Commonwealth’s court system, see infra Section II.C.
42. For a comparison of the supreme court’s King’s Bench powers and extraordinary jurisdiction powers, see infra Section II.D.
43. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 528; see also supra note 4 (highlighting King’s
Bench statute).
44. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 502 (1976).
45. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 528 (stating court’s ability to appeal to House
of Peers of England disappeared after American Revolution). Some commentators might fail to recognize that the commonwealth never intended for King’s
Bench to be a court of last resort until the legislature eliminated the House of
Peers. See id. at 535–36 (acknowledging English judicial review system never intended for King’s Bench to be a court of last resort).
46. Id. at 528 (analyzing Pennsylvania High Court of Errors and Appeals’ former structure). The general assembly of Pennsylvania directed those whose ap-
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integrated, leaving the supreme court as the highest commonwealth appellate court.47
One of the first discussions of King’s Bench in Pennsylvania came in
the 1847 Commonwealth v. Nathans 48 opinion, a certiorari proceeding concerning a marital dispute.49 The proceeding sought to resolve whether
special jurisdiction the legislature created for the issue prevented the supreme court from adjudicating.50 The court stated it would be an “act of
usurpation” to hear the case when special jurisdiction is designated for
another tribunal.51 The court declined to strip jurisdiction from the
Pennsylvania Court of Quarter Sessions because the legislature already
gave the court authority to adjudicate.52 The case served as the supreme
court’s first discussion of King’s Bench powers after the abolishment of
the Pennsylvania High Court of Errors and Appeals and demonstrated the
court’s initial hesitance to extend the powers past hearing a case of first
impression.53
Twelve years later, the Commonwealth v. Ickhoff 54 decision answered
another question of how far King’s Bench powers extended and whether
the justices could hear a high criminal appeal regarding jail deliveries.55
peals had not been adjudicated by the King of England to refile them with the
newly formed court. Id. at 529 (discussing “restored” link between Pennsylvania
court and English court).
47. See id. at 528–29 (explaining general assembly’s 1780 Act was designed to
rectify absence of House of Peers Court to appeal to after American Revolution).
The supreme court did not gain its broadest powers as a court of last resort until
1834 when it subsumed the duties of the Court of Errors and Appeals. Id. at 530.
48. 5 Pa. 124 (1847).
49. Id. at 126 (explaining defendant’s wife submitted application for certiorari and wanted to be removed from defendant’s estate); see also Sherer, supra note
7, at 530 (“[G]uardians of the poor [brought an action] to compel the maintenance of a wife and children by a deserting husband . . . .”). A certiorari is a
superior court’s tool to command inferior courts to transfer pending proceedings.
Certiorari, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
50. Nathans, 5 Pa. at 125 (concluding court did not have power to “snatch”
jurisdiction from another tribunal which previously had special jurisdiction). The
court acknowledged it never performed this type of removal, and its power in the
matter was “purely correctional.” Id.
51. Id. at 125.
52. Id. at 125–26 (concluding legislature as proper vehicle for determining
whether supreme court has authority to hear court proceeding); see also Sherer,
supra note 7, at 530 (stating Chief Justice Gibson limited power to exercise King’s
Bench to first instance of cases). While the supreme court reemphasized its ability
to remove a case through certiorari, the ability of the Court of Quarter Sessions to
hear the case was given by statute. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 530.
53. See Nathans, 5 Pa. at 126 (stating supreme court has never exercised King’s
Bench powers to remove cases in manner requested by appealing party).
54. 33 Pa. 80 (1859).
55. See id. at 80–81 (demonstrating supreme court has jurisdiction spanning
across commonwealth, thus, each justice is supreme justice of Oyer and Terminer
and jail delivery). The supreme court in Ickhoff granted the request of a president
judge who asked a member of the court to hear a case that the president judge
could not hear. Id. at 80.
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The court concluded it possessed the ability to send one of its justices to
hear the case instead of the presiding president judge in the lower court.56
The court, citing to the Judiciary Act of 1722, contended its jurisdiction to
hear the Oyer and Terminer proceeding flowed naturally from the traditional exercise of King’s Bench powers and provided it authority to hear
the case.57 In relying on King’s Bench, the court exercised its power to
hear cases when the legal issue prevented the presiding judge from making a decision.58 Unlike Nathans, the court in Ickhoff relied on historical
English King’s Bench jurisprudence and focused on how the original
bench provided the chief justice the ability to hear a criminal certiorari
proceeding.59
It was not until Commonwealth v. Balph 60 in 1886 that the court exercised its powers in the removal of a traditional criminal proceeding.61 The
petition in Balph contended that the trial in a particular county could not
be fairly adjudicated because of overwhelming prejudice in the community.62 In making the decision to remove and promptly hear the case, the
court provided a comprehensive overview of King’s Bench powers at the
56. Id. at 82 (ruling supreme court justice could be sent to hear case).
57. Id. (concluding history of King’s Bench allows for one of court’s justices
to try case). The court studied the history of King’s Bench and used its function in
England as a way to exemplify how its powers should apply in Pennsylvania. Id. at
81–82. The Court clarified that Common Pleas judges have Oyer and Terminer
power only within their own district, but the supreme court’s powers were not as
limited. See Court of Oyer and Terminer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining courts of Oyer and Terminer as capable of hearing high criminal appeals and possessing ability to try prisoners in criminal court).
58. Ickhoff, 33 Pa. at 80–81 (ruling supreme court could hear jail delivery proceeding even if it is not delegated by statute).
59. See id. at 81 (stating then-current Pennsylvania supreme court lacks distinction between chief justice and associate justices unlike original King’s Bench).
60. 3 A. 220 (Pa. 1886).
61. See id. at 225 (concluding supreme court has power to remove criminal
cases, where litigants sought transfer to another county, without controversy). In
Balph, the petitioners requested removal of their conspiracy and assault criminal
proceeding because the county they resided in made it impossible to have a fair
trial. Id. at 221–22. The court agreed with the petitioners’ argument that there
was no possibility of a fair proceeding and concluded King’s Bench jurisdiction
gave the court ample authority to remove and quickly hear the case. Id. at 230
(asserting supreme court is responsible for ensuring all people have “fair and impartial trial[s],” and could use King’s Bench powers to ensure this happened).
The court believed the plain language of the Criminal Code of 1860, in conjunction with the historical practices of King’s Bench, authorized it to act on the criminal proceeding. Id. at 224–25.
62. Id. at 221–22 (explaining two counties claimed to have requisite jurisdiction to hear relevant proceeding). The court sided with the petitioner’s argument
and explained how it has the capability to remove the proceeding from that particular county. Id. at 222 (“I say [the power] still exists, because no one doubts the
power was lodged in this court up to and until the adoption of the present constitution. It has been not only asserted but exercised repeatedly.”).
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time the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Judiciary Act of 1722.63 The
majority opinion explained how King’s Bench serves to “protect the liberty
of the subject” and ensure the subject has a fair trial and adjudication.64
Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion urged the court to strictly limit the
powers of King’s Bench to erroneously decided cases so that the supreme
court only corrects the error.65 It suggested that the justices’ powers
should be confined to those specified by law and using King’s Bench too
greatly expanded the court’s powers.66
Only a few years later, In re Pollard 67 challenged the court to revisit its
King’s Bench oversight role over the Pennsylvania Court of Quarter Sessions and determine how far its jurisdiction extended.68 The court reversed the decision of the Pennsylvania Court of Quarter Sessions
regarding a liquor license and explained why it has jurisdiction when a
petitioner submits a writ of certiorari.69 The prior law for granting retail
liquor licenses prevented the supreme court from having the ability to review a writ of certiorari, but after comparison of the prior and present
laws, the court determined it could examine the lower court’s decision.70
63. See id. at 225 (explaining plenary powers of King’s Bench and its duty to
protect causes of crown and plea sides of court). After reviewing other states’ decisions to use pseudo-King’s Bench powers, the court reiterated the inherent nature
of its power and the difficulty in removing it. See id. at 227 (believing court’s decision to retain King’s Bench power to be proper, considering other states’ decisions
based off same extent of powers as King’s Bench); see also Sherer, supra note 7, at
531 (citing Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 61 A.2d 426, 428 (Pa. 1948))
(highlighting supreme court’s first instance of assuming superintendency over all
jurisdictions through King’s Bench). For a further discussion of the Carpentertown
case and holding, see infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
64. Balph, 3 A. 220 at 225.
65. See id. at 233 (Trunkey, J., dissenting) (stating certiorari should not be
decided by supreme court unless lower courts have made final judgment that was
erroneous). Justice Trunkey opined that the decision allows the court to use
King’s Bench to void decisions of lowers courts that have jurisdiction even when
the lower courts do not make error. See id.
66. See id. at 234 (Trunkey, J., dissenting) (concluding supreme court should
not extend its authority so far because it already has “abundant” power).
67. 17 A. 1087 (Pa. 1889).
68. See id. at 1090 (concluding supreme court has undeniable authority over
Court of Quarter Sessions proceedings). The record before the supreme court
showed no specific objection to the Court of Quarter Sessions’ ruling, and the
supreme court questioned whether the matter was still reviewable. See id. The
court held that the Court of Quarter Sessions applied existing law for obtaining
liquor licenses in an arbitrary manner. See id. at 1089. The only criteria the Court
of Quarter Sessions should have used, according to the supreme court, was
whether a citizen of good character provided a completed license application, and
if so, that citizen should have had the right to the license. See id.
69. See id. at 1090 (recognizing supreme court’s ability to simultaneously
grant lower tribunal ample power but also ensure decisions are properly made in
its oversight role).
70. See id. at 1088–89 (comparing differences in retail liquor laws and determining law in question required minimal qualifications for citizens to receive liquor licenses).
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In total, early nineteenth century King’s Bench jurisprudence left the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primarily responsible for determining how
far its own powers extended as opposed to the legislature dictating its
boundaries.
In the twentieth century, the supreme court expanded its interpretation of King’s Bench powers.71 In Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird,72
the court invoked plenary jurisdiction using King’s Bench in response to a
writ of prohibition submitted by Carpentertown Coal and Coke Company
(the Company).73 The Company submitted the writ in response to the
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission’s failure to properly construct a
bridge.74 The court concluded that its authority to determine whether
the State Mining Commission could compel the Company to show cause
came from King’s Bench authority; it believed its power over lower tribunals had never before been limited by any procedure.75 Although the
court did not grant the requested writ of prohibition, it provided significant clarification of the supreme court’s oversight abilities and effectively
broadened the scope of King’s Bench powers.76 The decision served as

71. See, e.g., Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 61 A.2d 426, 428 (Pa.
1948) (assuming plenary jurisdiction over State Mining Commission case); In re
Petitions of Bell, 152 A.2d 731, 734 (Pa. 1959) (asserting jurisdiction over proceeding improperly heard by Pennsylvania Superior Court).
72. 61 A.2d 426 (Pa. 1948).
73. See id. at 427 (stating the Company filed petition after Chairman of the
State Mining Commission redecided its appeal). Even though the State Mining
Commission originally ruled in favor of the Company regarding the Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission’s right to damages, the State Mining Commission subsequently requested the Company show cause for why damages should not have
been granted. Id. The State Mining Commission did not place a limit on the
amount of minable coal the Company could excavate. Id. (detailing original action brought by Company was to determine how much coal can be mined around
physical construction of Pennsylvania turnpike). Two years after an initial determination by the State Mining Commission, the Company petitioned the supreme
court in response to the State Mining Commission compelling the Company and
its lessor, Thaw Coke Trust, to show cause. Id. (emphasizing supreme court had
already determined State Mining Commission had jurisdiction over issue). A writ
of prohibition is used to “prevent an inferior judicial tribunal from assuming a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested in cases where damage and injustice
would otherwise be likely to follow from such action.” Id. at 428.
74. Id.
75. See id. (explaining nature of writ of prohibition and its function of
preventing another tribunal from deciding an issue it does not have jurisdiction
over). The supreme court answered this question by using its King’s Bench powers
and its recognition of the ability to issue writs outside of its original jurisdiction
powers. See id. at 428–29 (addressing Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission’s argument and finding supreme court has no justification for issuing writs of
prohibition).
76. See id. at 430 (refusing to grant the writ of prohibition and explaining how
determinations on whether to grant writ involve discretionary choices on part of
supreme court).
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the first time the supreme court cited to the superintendency power
King’s Bench possesses.77
Approximately twenty years later, the court in In re Petitions of Bell 78
addressed the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s dismissal of claims in a
case concerning police misconduct.79 After the superior court reversed
the decisions of three county courts that ruled against the accused police
officers, the city of Philadelphia filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that
the superior court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
incorrectly adjudicated the issue.80 Because the superior court had already dismissed the cases, the supreme court reviewed the matter using
King’s Bench and held the lower court incorrectly concluded it possessed
proper jurisdiction.81 According to the statutorily prescribed procedure
in the County Court of Allegheny County, the final orders designated no
right to appeal to the superior court.82
As time progressed, the supreme court grew more comfortable using
King’s Bench powers and moved away from its initial reluctance in
Nathans.83 The court evolved from deferring to special jurisdiction created by legislation to assuming plenary jurisdiction in Carpentertown.84 Initially, the court did not use King’s Bench powers as a last resort option, but
77. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 531. References to the court’s “superintendency over inferior tribunals” mean the court oversees and adjudicates decisions in
all lower courts within its jurisdiction. In re Petitions of Bell, 152 A.2d 731, 734 (Pa.
1959). King’s Bench assigns the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as the “supervisor[ ]” of lower courts just like the original King’s Bench of England.
Carpentertown, 61 A.2d at 428–29.
78. 152 A.2d 731 (Pa. 1959).
79. See id. at 733 (commenting on superior court’s disposal of claims).
80. Id. at 733–34 (reviewing superior court’s decision to consolidate three
separate county court appeals and issue single order reversing all three decisions).
81. See id. at 739 (holding superior court’s decision must be reversed due to
error in hearing case). In assuming King’s Bench powers, the supreme court clarified the superior court does not possess any powers like King’s Bench and has
jurisdiction only provided by law. See id. at 734 (explaining how King’s Bench powers provide supreme court with appellate review even though not statutorily prescribed); see also Sherer, supra note 7, at 532 (calling supreme court’s usage of
King’s Bench powers in In re Bell “[t]he most evident assertion of the . . . power of
superintendence . . . .”).
82. See In re Bell, 152 A.2d at 733 (asserting procedure in place did not statutorily provide opportunity to appeal from county court’s final orders). The county
court’s decision to affirm came after lengthy testimony and admittance of evidence
from one of the other policemen. See id.
83. See, e.g., Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 61 A.2d 426, 428 (Pa.
1948) (concluding supreme court can use King’s Bench to issue writ prohibition);
In re Pollard, 17 A. 1087, 1088–89 (Pa. 1889) (using King’s Bench to reverse Court
of Quarter Session decision); Commonwealth v. Balph, 3 A. 220, 225 (Pa. 1886)
(removing case using King’s Bench). For an analysis of the supreme court’s decision not to exercise King’s Bench powers in Nathans, see supra Section II.A.
84. Compare Commonwealth v. Nathans, 5 Pa. 124, 126 (1847) (deferring to
Court of Quarter Sessions), with Carpentertown, 61 A.2d at 427 (reviewing petition
asking supreme court to decide an issue already designated for State Mining
Commission).
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nevertheless used the powers in different lower court cases.85 Because using King’s Bench effectively distorted the standard procedures of the
cases, critics became more skeptical of how far-reaching King’s Bench
powers actually were.86
B. The 1968 Constitutional Convention Questions King’s Bench Authority
Almost a decade after Bell, the general assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania gathered for the 1968 Constitutional Convention
(Convention).87 Among other things, the assembly deliberated over the
sweeping powers granted to the supreme court through King’s Bench.88
While certain delegates argued the court can take away its own inherent
powers, others stipulated that the legislature could remove the power according to its article II powers under the commonwealth’s constitution,
and allowing the court to exercise King’s Bench encroached too far into
legislative territory.89 Article V of the Pennsylvania constitution authorizes
the supreme court’s superintendency power over all lower courts, but
without the ability to rely on King’s Bench, delegates questioned whether
the court could still have the authority to execute its supervisory
obligations.90
Even after debates and revisions to article V, King’s Bench powers
remained intact and available for the supreme court to use.91 Delegates
85. For an analysis of the evolution of King’s Bench jurisprudence from the
early nineteenth century into the middle of the twentieth century, see supra Section II.A.
86. For a discussion of some delegates’ criticism of King’s Bench jurisprudence, see infra Section II.B.
87. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 533.
88. See Makosky, supra note 6, at 674 (“At the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, some delegates questioned whether the [King’s Bench] power
should be removed.”); Sherer, supra note 7, at 533–34 (discussing questions
presented by legislatures about King’s Bench powers at Convention).
89. See Ledewitz, supra note 20, at 411–12 (arguing rewriting of article V of
Pennsylvania constitution did not effectively curtail King’s Bench power and is not
unconstitutional because article V is what initially defines supreme court’s jurisdiction). Justice Roberts’ concurrence in Stander v. Kelley, 250 A.2d 474 (Pa. 1969)
opined on King’s Bench powers and how they were not eliminated or more controlled after article V was revised. See id. (suggesting supreme court cannot claim
constitutional powers unless explicitly provided by constitution itself, and disagreeing with Justice Roberts’ argument in Stander).
90. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 534–35 (highlighting problems arising from
reading article V, section 10(a) and article V, section 2(c) in conjunction with one
another). If the supreme court is to follow section 10(a) of the constitution and
perform its oversight duties but does not have a vehicle to do so pursuant to section 2(c), the court would be unable to act even if some justices believe it should.
See id. at 534–35 (displaying struggle of commonwealth’s legislature in articulating
supreme court’s jurisdiction and whether it can be considered “advise-and-consent
jurisdiction”).
91. See Makosky, supra note 6, at 674–75 (stating King’s Bench jurisdiction
remained even after debates because some delegates believed power to be inherent and unremovable).
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suggested that the powers must remain because they are inherent regardless of the state’s constitution.92 The court showed no reservations using
the power after the Convention, invoking them to decide issues ranging
from gubernatorial power to appoint judges to suspension of judiciary
members.93 The court continued to use King’s Bench powers to fulfill its
judicial oversight role as prescribed by article V of the commonwealth’s
constitution.94 It demonstrated flexibility exercising its powers absent
prior decisions or recommendations, but it elaborated on the breadth of
the powers after constitutional debate.95
C. King’s Bench v. Extraordinary Jurisdiction
In addition to King’s Bench powers, the supreme court has the ability
to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction over lower court proceedings.96 Petitioners and lower tribunals can potentially confuse both forms of jurisdiction, but the terms are not synonymous.97 Extraordinary jurisdiction
92. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 533–34 (stating legislature would need to obtain approval of supreme court in order to remove inherent jurisdiction it has
already been granted).
93. See, e.g., In re Franciscus, 369 A.2d 1190, 1191 (Pa. 1977) (reviewing suspension by supreme court of Justice of the Peace for Magisterial District 05-2-44,
Allegheny County, before receiving suspension recommendation by Judicial Inquiry and Review Board); id. at 1192–93 (highlighting supreme court’s ability to
exercise power over lower tribunals using King’s Bench); Creamer v. Twelve Common Pleas Judges, 281 A.2d 57, 58 (Pa. 1971) (per curiam) (reviewing supreme
court’s prior decision to assume plenary jurisdiction of gubernatorial appointments without any other previous lower court decision).
94. See Franciscus, 369 A.2d at 1192 (demonstrating supreme court’s obligation to oversee all courts and justices of peace); id. at 1193 (recognizing other state
supreme courts’ abilities to supervise lower court’s conduct). The court concluded it had the ability to issue the temporary suspension until the Judicial Conduct Board submitted another recommendation to the court. See id. at 1194.
95. The supreme court continued to rely on section 2(c) of the commonwealth constitution when utilizing King’s Bench powers—a provision that served as
the point of contention for whether King’s Bench should be revoked. See Stander
v. Kelley, 250 A.2d 474, 486–87 (Pa. 1969) (Roberts, J., concurring) (opining
King’s Bench powers were in no way limited by post-1968 Convention).
96. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 726 (1976) (amended 2004) (prescribing supreme court’s ability to assume jurisdiction over any issue “involving an issue of
immediate public importance”). The supreme court’s extraordinary jurisdiction
are detailed as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Supreme Court may, on
its own motion or upon petition of any part, in any matter pending
before any court or magisterial district judge of this Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public importance, assume plenary jurisdiction
of such matter at any stage thereof and enter a final order or otherwise
cause right and justice to be done.
Id. (emphasis added).
97. Compare § 726 (stating supreme court has ability through extraordinary
jurisdiction to hear matters pending before lower court at any stage), with § 502
(1976) (granting supreme court King’s Bench powers). See WEST’S PA. FORMS,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1:5, supra note 8 (emphasizing similarities between supreme
court’s King’s Bench powers and extraordinary jurisdiction powers); In re Assign-
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grants the supreme court ability to assume plenary jurisdiction over a pending matter at any stage of the judicial process and to rule on the issue,
while King’s Bench does not require a matter to be pending.98 Unlike
extraordinary jurisdiction, King’s Bench permits the court to hear nonpending cases, review sentencing decisions, or take up cases where losing
parties have no option of appeal.99
Extraordinary jurisdiction requires the supreme court to cautiously
select matters of immediate public importance requiring timely intervention.100 The court has interjected in pressing public matters using both
forms of jurisdiction while simultaneously explaining why it is proper.101
For example, in League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth,102 the court
elected to use extraordinary jurisdiction and relied on the Free and Equal
Elections Clause of the Pennsylvania constitution in declaring the Pennsylvania Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011 unconstitutional.103 It is
easy for other judicial bodies to confuse the two forms of jurisdiction bement of Avellino, 690 A.2d 1138, 1140 (Pa. 1997) (distinguishing between extraordinary jurisdiction and King’s Bench powers, and discussing more limited
applicability of extraordinary jurisdiction).
98. See § 726 (prescribing supreme court with extraordinary jurisdiction);
§ 502 (granting King’s Bench jurisdiction in Judiciary Act of 1722).
99. See WEST’S PA. FORMS, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1:5, supra note 8 (explaining
how King’s Bench gives court authority to hear matters where no appeals are
pending).
100. See § 726 (requiring issues of “immediate public importance”).
101. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 766 (Pa.
2018) (reviewing petitioners’ extraordinary jurisdiction request while commonwealth court waited for U.S. Supreme Court to decide Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct.
1916 (2018)). The petitioners challenged the drawing of congressional districts
and whether the Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011 violated the Pennsylvania
constitution. Id. at 741–43. See generally Bd. of Revision of Taxes, City of Phila. v.
City of Philadelphia, 4 A.3d 610, 620 (Pa. 2010)) (explaining differences between
King’s Bench and extraordinary jurisdiction). In Board of Revision of Taxes, the petitioners, Board of Revision of Taxes (BRT) originally requested the supreme court
to exercise either original jurisdiction or King’s Bench powers. See id. at 614. After
the May 2010 primary election, the issue concerning the Philadelphia BRT resurfaced—leading to the BRT’s second King’s Bench petition. See id. at 615 (reviewing supreme court’s previous per curiam order denying BRT’s request to exercise
King’s Bench). The supreme court believed it was urgent to examine the BRT’s
petition so the local system of taxation and revenue collection could properly function in Philadelphia. See id. at 620 (selecting extraordinary jurisdiction as proper
avenue for hearing case).
102. 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018).
103. See id. at 766–67 (reviewing court’s decision exercising plenary jurisdiction but remanding matter back to commonwealth court for expedited discovery
period); id. at 741 (concluding 2011 redistricting plan was unconstitutional gerrymandering). The court initially provided only a per curiam order concluding its
unconstitutionality, but inaction from the general assembly prompted the court to
choose a new district plan. See id. at 741–42 (explaining why opinion should be
read in conjunction with prior court order). But see id. at 831 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (explaining why court’s usage of extraordinary jurisdiction was
“improvident”).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5

692

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: p. 677

cause they are used in similar high-stakes situations.104 With extraordinary jurisdiction and King’s Bench as available options to the court, seven
elected justices are trusted with an immense amount of decision-making
power.105
III. THE SUPREME COURT

OF
OF

PENNSYLVANIA’S CONTINUED INVOCATION
KING’S BENCH

In the last several years, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has invoked King’s Bench powers in a few notable instances, showing its continued receptivity to King’s Bench petitions.106 In hearing these cases, the
court continually clarifies the powers’ capabilities.107 In most instances,
the supreme court chooses situations posing a threat to the judiciary’s integrity or criminal proceedings with significant societal implications.108
These are the scenarios where the powers are needed most and should be
used most.
A. The Most Recent Invocations of King’s Bench
In 1997, the court used King’s Bench powers to order a lower court
judge to comply with a felony-waiver program.109 After a fellow common
104. See, e.g., FOCUS v. Allegheny Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 842
(3d Cir. 1996) (comparing King’s Bench authority to Third Circuit’s extraordinary
jurisdiction capabilities); Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 1996) (conflating
statute granting extraordinary jurisdiction to supreme court with King’s Bench
authority).
105. Compare § 726 (detailing supreme court’s extraordinary jurisdiction powers), with § 502 (prescribing court with King’s Bench powers). The powers of extraordinary jurisdiction and King’s Bench have proven to be more flexible than
other functions of government. See Aldisert, supra note 23, at 486 (stating supreme
court’s “unabashed power” does not have to rely on legislature to assert its predominance of important cases within commonwealth judicial system).
106. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A. 3d 1199, 1207 (Pa. 2015)
(concluding King’s Bench jurisdiction is proper when determining constitutionality of gubernatorial reprieve of death row sentence); In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635,
687 (Pa. 2014) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that Judicial Conduct Board and
Court of Judicial Discipline has exclusive jurisdiction over judicial misconduct
claims); In re Assignment of Avellino, 690 A.2d 1138, 1140–41 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting
argument that supreme court could not hear case because it was not statutorily
prescribed for the court).
107. For a discussion of the supreme court’s rationale for using King’s Bench
in recent years, see infra Section III.A.
108. For an analysis of the supreme court’s flexibility in exercising King’s
Bench to cure threats to the integrity of the judiciary, see infra Sections III.A–C.
109. See Avellino, 690 A.2d at 1140 (rejecting Judge Avellino’s argument
against supreme court using King’s Bench powers in matter); see generally Robert
Rhodes, First Time Felony Waiver, RHODES LEGAL GRP., PLLC, https://rhodeslegal
group.com/criminal-law/first-time-felony-waiver/ [https://perma.cc/2YNQ-NE
9L] (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (discussing alternatives to prison sentence for individuals facing first time felony conviction). A felony-waiver program generally allows an individual to qualify for a lighter sentence if he or she has never been
previously convicted of a felony and never participated in a felony deferred prosecution program. See id.
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pleas judge petitioned the supreme court to exercise King’s Bench, the
judge in question claimed the petition constituted retaliatory action from
the district’s president judge.110 The judge in question argued against the
court’s compliance mandate and stated the supreme court lacked the capability for enforcement.111 The supreme court promptly exercised its
King’s Bench powers because the court’s ultimate decision of whether
compliance was necessary was still pending.112 The supreme court rejected all three of the non-complying judge’s arguments, concluding its
role in overseeing judicial assignments gave it the capability to review such
disputes.113 The court concluded it could review the matter because any
decisions regarding judicial assignments stem from its oversight
responsibilities.114
Even more recently, in In re Bruno,115 a federal grand jury indicted
Magisterial District Judge Mark A. Bruno for criminal conspiracy and wire
fraud—prompting the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to revoke his judicial responsibilities and to suspend him without pay.116 The grand jury
indicted Judge Bruno and nine other traffic court judges for involvement
in a “ticket-fixing” scandal designed to favor the judge’s own personal connections.117 Petitioners tasked the supreme court with determining
whether it had the power to suspend the jurists for disciplinary reasons.118
While the petitioning judges acknowledged the court had removed,
suspended, or disciplined jurists before, they alleged the court did not
have the ability to suspend Judge Bruno because of article V, section 18 of
110. See Avellino, 690 A.2d at 1139 (detailing Judge Avellino’s arguments for
non-compliance leading to supreme court’s challenge).
111. Id. at 1141 (arguing extraordinary jurisdiction did not apply because
there was no matter pending, and the case did not fit into any extraordinary jurisdiction category).
112. See id. at 1140 (explaining Judge Avellino’s contention that supreme
court did not have authority to hear case because there was no matter pending in
lower court); id. at 1143–44 (concluding Judge Avellino must abide by Judge Herron’s decision and threatening to impose sanctions on Avellino for his actions).
“We therefore reject Judge Avellino’s argument that this Court cannot take cognizance of the dispute because the subject matter does not fall within our original
statutory jurisdiction . . . .” Id. at 1140.
113. See id. at 1141.
114. See id. (finding Judge Avellino’s refusal to comply with presiding judge’s
order was an act of “unjustified defiance”); id. 1143–44 (relying on In re Franciscus,
369 A.2d 1190, 1191–92 (Pa. 1977) to show article V, section 18 of constitution did
not eliminate court’s supervisory power).
115. 101 A.3d 635 (Pa. 2014).
116. See id. at 640–41 n.1 (reviewing federal investigation of “ticket-fixing”
scandal in Philadelphia for those who were “politically and socially connected”).
117. Id.
118. See id. at 642 (considering whether entering orders of suspensions for
jurists falls primarily under purview of the Court of Judicial Discipline). Respondents argued the supreme court’s use of King’s Bench in the matter ensured the
court would uphold its oversight responsibilities. Id. at 651 (explaining respondents’ argument that article V section 18 of commonwealth constitution did not
serve to strip power away from supreme court).
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the constitution.119 This part of the Pennsylvania constitution codifies the
Judicial Conduct Board (JCB) and elaborates on the procedures, composition, and actions of the Board itself.120 The petitioners argued that, because the general assembly eliminated the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board and formed the Court of Judicial Discipline (CJD) and JCB, the
newly formed bodies had exclusive jurisdiction over judicial discipline
matters.121 Thus, the petitioners alleged that relieving former Judge
Bruno of his responsibilities and suspending him without pay encroached
upon the JCB’s and CJD’s jurisdiction.122
In reaching its conclusion, the court proffered a comprehensive analysis of its King’s Bench powers.123 The supreme court broadly construed
its power and noted its recent flexibility using King’s Bench for decisions
threatening the judiciary’s integrity.124 The court reflected on its suggestive history, stating King’s Bench was meant to “transcend forms of procedure” and help fulfill its supervisory obligation for lower courts.125 The
119. Id. at 644 (highlighting petitioners’ argument that supreme court has
never established extent of its disciplinary authority); id. at 688 (addressing hierarchy of supreme court over Court of Judicial Discipline proceedings); id. at 651
(reiterating petitioners’ arguments that amendments producing Court of Judicial
Discipline and JCB altered how Pennsylvania judiciary addresses problems of judicial misconduct).
120. See PA. CONST. art. V. § 18(b) (“The board shall be composed of [twelve]
members, as follows: two judges, other than senior judges, one from the courts of
common pleas and the other from either the [s]uperior [c]ourt or the
[c]ommonwealth [c]ourt, one justice of the peace who need not be a member of
the bar of the [s]upreme [c]ourt, three non-judge members of the bar of the
[s]upreme [c]ourt and six non-lawyer electors.”).
121. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 645 (arguing formation of CJD and JCB prevent
supreme court from having ability to “commence proceedings independently”).
122. Id. at 643–44 (addressing AOPC’s argument that supreme court and CJD
have concurrent jurisdiction, but supreme court’s authority trumps CJD’s authority); see also § 18 (articulating authority of JCB and CJD).
123. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 642 (distinguishing CJD’s decision to suspend
Judge Bruno with pay from supreme court’s decision to suspend without pay).
124. See id. at 681 n.25 (examining petitioners’ argument that 1993 amendments of article V, section 18 reduced supreme court’s ability to act in cases where
Board or CJD might act). Petitioners attempted to distinguish between Avellino
and the pending matter, stating it was a judicial discipline case and Avellino involved judicial misconduct. See id. at 646 (addressing petitioners’ question of
whether this constituted judicial misconduct or judicial discipline). Justice McCaffery’s concurrence reminded petitioners the court placed suspensions on the jurists in each of those cases. See id. at 704 n.2 (McCaffery, J., concurring)
(debunking petitioners’ argument that case was distinguishable from Avellino or
Franciscus). Justice McCaffery also believed that distinguishing this matter as “disciplinary” as opposed to previous matters would result in “endless haggling in future
cases.” Id. (McCaffery, J., concurring). The court rejected the petitioners’ interpretation of the authority, opining it was its constitutional authority to use King’s
Bench as understood. See id. at 678–79 (concluding petitioners’ argument creates
“false dichotomy,” and court’s supervisory power is inevitable).
125. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 679 (holding King’s Bench should be exercised
when supreme court finds it necessary to do so). By using past examples of the
court exercising King’s Bench, the court exemplified its ability to use it for “rela-
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court mentioned instances where King’s Bench decisions were not published and noted this does not create the assumption that it cannot exercise its constitutional authority.126 Tribunals like the CJD and JCB
remained within the supreme court’s oversight powers, although some justices believed the court should have been more cautious using King’s
Bench as justification for involvement.127 The court reiterated its capability of assuming jurisdiction over any civil or criminal matter, even if the
matter is not pending.128
Only a year after In re Bruno, the Commonwealth petitioned the court
to determine whether it could review a decision by the Governor of Pennsylvania to issue a stay of execution for a death row inmates.129 The Commonwealth’s petition resulted from Governor Tom Wolf’s reprieve of the
defendant’s sentence and his intention to place a statewide moratorium
on the death penalty.130 The defendant previously had his death sentence
reinstated and fourth Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition denied.131 The Commonwealth argued Governor Wolf’s order “violated the
tively mundane tasks relating to temporary assignments of judges to fill vacancies
on the bench, priority of commission, or judicial assignments to divisions within a
trial court, and related adjudicatory obligations.” Id. at 675 (detailing past instances where supreme court used King’s Bench powers).
126. See id. at 679 n.23 (noting petitioners’ argument that King’s Bench was
never used to suspend jurists before 1968 ratification of Pennsylvania’s constitution). The court referred to its “own core duties” as sufficient rationale for stepping in despite a lack of judicial precedent. Id.
127. See id. at 686 (stating article V, section 18 addressing CJD did not lessen
jurisdiction of supreme court’s King’s Bench powers). The court rejected the notion that the CJD and supreme court did not have concurrent jurisdiction and
reiterated the CJD’s ability to continue the sanctions process. But see id. at 697
(Saylor, J., concurring) (suggesting majority’s argument may extend power of
King’s Bench too far but is proper in context of suspensions); id. at 699 (Baer, J.,
concurring) (deferring to CJD because it conducted fact finding and heard arguments relevant to the case—information that was not initially available to supreme
court).
128. See id. at 686 (stating article V section 18 does not restrain supreme
court’s King’s Bench powers because the CJD and supreme court’s ability to adjudicate “are distinct and may comfortably operate separately”).
129. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199, 1202–03 (Pa. 2015) (introducing appeal brought by Commonwealth). The petition contended Governor
Tom Wolf exceeded his constitutional authority and violated the separation of
powers by attempting to erase existing death sentences. Id. at 1203. Governor
Wolf conditioned the capital punishment reprieve on the type of recommendations he would receive from a task force assigned with studying Pennsylvania’s capital punishment system. Id. at 1202 n.3 (defining “moratorium” and clarifying
Governor Wolf’s intention to introduce moratorium on death penalty).
130. Id. at 1201–02 (addressing Williams’s petition and subsequent signing of
his execution by former Governor Tom Corbett). Governor Wolf stated he would
not implement a death penalty sentence until a task force conducted a study on
the death penalty as applied in Pennsylvania. Id. at 1202.
131. Id. at 1201 (recounting defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder after robbing and killing an individual as well as the subsequent sentence).
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doctrine of separation of powers by seeking to nullify valid, final judgments of sentence.”132
The court recognized it could invoke King’s Bench in similar ways to
its use of extraordinary jurisdiction and noted the importance of the issue
at hand.133 Governor Wolf encouraged the court to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction because the petition lacked a pending case in a lower
court.134 This strategy would, in effect, force the petitioner to file suit and
go through normal procedural processes instead of using King’s Bench to
bypass litigation. Even though the Commonwealth challenged an executive action, the supreme court elected to exercise King’s Bench.135 The
court declined to determine whether it should use extraordinary jurisdiction instead of King’s Bench because it found King’s Bench sufficient to
adjudicate.136 Even though the court granted the King’s Bench petition,
it upheld the constitutionality of Governor Wolf’s reprieve—stating he did
not intend to permanently abandon the death sentence, but merely issue a
reprieve so a task force could conduct a capital punishment study.137
B. The “Kids for Cash” Scandal
The 2008 Pennsylvania “Kids for Cash” scandal is another recent instance where the court used King’s Bench after discovering an unprecedented threat to the judiciary’s integrity.138 The scandal implicated two
132. Id. at 1203 (explaining Commonwealth’s argument as well as Governor’s
argument that reprieve was made in accordance with existing constitutional authority). Governor Wolf conceded the supreme court previously used King’s
Bench to “address allegations that another branch of government has encroached
upon its judicial power,” but suggested the court narrow its King’s Bench powers to
supervision. Id. at 1205 (detailing Governor’s argument for why King’s Bench
should not be exercised).
133. See id. at 1206 (acknowledging King’s Bench is used to review issues requiring swift action). In choosing to exercise King’s Bench, the court declined to
narrowly construe its King’s Bench authority. See id. at 1207 (concluding the Commonwealth showed ample reasons why issue requires timely intervention and why
King’s Bench needs to be invoked).
134. Id. at 1205 (explaining Governor’s argument for exercising extraordinary jurisdiction to avoid “technical maneuvering” of cases by lower courts).
135. See id. at 1206–07 (explaining neither Governor nor defendant has provided persuasive reasons for why King’s Bench powers should not be exercised).
The court grounded its decision invoking King’s Bench using a similar argument
as In re Bruno—that article V’s 1968 amendments did not intend to limit the inherent authority of the court. See id. at 1206 n.10.
136. Id. at 1207 n.11.
137. See id. at 1211–12 (asserting Governor Wolf has extensive executive reprieve power, including the ability to grant reprieve in criminal cases). The supreme court did not evaluate the validity of the reprieve, but affirmed only its
constitutionality. Id. at 1218.
138. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 671 (Pa. 2014) (recognizing supreme
court’s appointment of special master to review judicial misconduct). The court
not only appointed a special master to review prior decisions, but also required the
President Judge of Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas to submit monthly
reports outlining steps taken to cure the court system of prior injustices. See id. at
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former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges who denied
thousands of juveniles fair criminal proceedings while on trial and, for
doing so, received payments from a private juvenile detention facility.139
The juveniles in question often lacked representation at trials in front of
former Judges Michael Conahan and Mark Ciaverella Jr., depriving them
of constitutional rights, unfairly sending them to juvenile placement facilities, all while the judges collected profit kickbacks.140 The supreme court
denied an initial King’s Bench petition in the matter, but after former
Judges Conahan and Ciaverella were federally indicted, the court appointed a special master using King’s Bench to review the judges’ previous
juvenile court adjudications.141 The supreme court characterized the corruption scandal as an instance exemplifying why King’s Bench should exist.142 The judiciary lacked a clear way of rectifying the situation and
relied on King’s Bench as a way to fact find and investigate.143
C. King’s Bench and the Death Penalty
Importantly, subsequent opinions by the supreme court have recognized the subjectivity of King’s Bench powers and the option for the court
not to adjudicate an issue of extraordinary importance.144 In September
2019, the federal defender’s office in Philadelphia issued a petition for the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to exercise King’s Bench to decide the
constitutionality of the death penalty as applied in Pennsylvania.145 The
671. Exercising King’s Bench in this particular situation allowed the court to act
quickly, and the procedure itself was not prescribed by the constitution, rules, or
any statutes. See id. at 672.
139. See Guggenheim & Hurtz, supra note 18, at 654 (detailing scheme behind “Kids for Cash” scandal).
140. Id. (explaining method that former Judges Ciaverella Jr. and Conahan
used to accept kickback payments for matriculating unrepresented juveniles into
placement facilities).
141. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 672 n.21 (discussing supreme court’s initial
failure to address Judge Ciaverella Jr. and Judge Conahan’s wrongdoing); id. at
673 (using special master on remand of defamation suit during “Kids for Cash”
scandal fallout); Guggenheim & Hurtz, supra note 18, at 655–56 (discussing supreme court’s initial unwillingness to exercise King’s Bench).
142. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 671. In the wake of the former judges’ indictments, as well as information jeopardizing the legitimacy of juvenile adjudications,
the supreme court retained plenary jurisdiction using King’s Bench, but did not
have a formulaic method of conducting future proceedings. See id.
143. Id. at 672 (arguing “the power of King’s Bench allowed the Court to
innovate a swift process and remedy appropriate to the exigencies of the event.”)
144. See id. at 705 (McCaffery, J., concurring) (criticizing supreme court’s initial response to “Kids for Cash” scandal and noting King’s Bench is not guaranteed
mechanism for curing injustices in courts). Justice McCaffery commented use of
King’s Bench in the scandal was not a “swift process” to cure injustice. See id. at
706.
145. An-Li Herring, PA Supreme Court to Consider Putting End to Death Penalty,
PITTSBURGH’S NPR NEWS STATION (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.wesa.fm/post/pasupreme-court-consider-putting-end-death-penalty#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/
UXC8-EMHS] (discussing pending petition before supreme court over whether
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supreme court justices had alluded to systemic flaws in the Commonwealth’s application of the death penalty in previous cases.146 Petitioners,
respondents, and other parties of interest submitted briefs arguing both
the merits of the issue and whether the court should exercise King’s
Bench in the first place.147 On the issue of whether the court should exerKing’s Bench should be exercised). The justices instructed parties at oral argument to explain whether it should exercise King’s Bench in addition to the merits
of the issue. Id. The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office submitted its own
study and brief to the supreme court in addition to the Joint State Government
Commission’s study on capital punishment as applied in Pennsylvania. Elizabeth
Weill-Greenberg, Philadelphia D.A. Asks Court to Declare Death Penalty System Unconstitutional, APPEAL (July 15, 2019), https://theappeal.org/philadelphia-d-a-asks-courtto-declare-death-penalty-system-unconstitutional/ [https://perma.cc/P5YW-DE26]
(reviewing Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner’s argument that death
penalty is disproportionately applied to minority defendants).
146. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199, 1220 (Pa. 2015) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (opining on role of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in future death
penalty proceedings). Justice Stevens separately noted issues the supreme court
may be faced with in the future concerning the death penalty and predicted what
recently happened to the commonwealth’s capital punishment system. See id.
(voicing concerns over redundancy of capital punishment system). Justice Stevens
stated:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is in danger of becoming irrelevant in
death penalty cases. Decades come and go after a defendant has had due
process of law and appropriate review by this Court, yet the decisions of
this Court affirming the convictions are ignored. The families of the victims are victimized again and again, this time by the failure of the criminal justice system to carry out the law.
Id. Further, current Chief Justice Thomas G. Saylor previously vocalized criticisms
of the way the death penalty is applied in Pennsylvania. See Thomas G. Saylor,
Death-Penalty Stewardship and the Current State of Pennsylvania Capital Jurisprudence, 23
WIDENER L.J. 1, 2 (2013) (highlighting impaired nature of how capital punishment
is applied in Pennsylvania). His criticism served as a reason why some believed the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would conclude capital punishment is cruel punishment as applied in Pennsylvania. Max Mitchell, Krasner Says Pa.’s Death Penalty Is
Unconstitutional. Here’s What Pa.’s Chief Justice Has Said, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (July
18, 2019, 5:15 PM), https://store.law.com/Registration/Login.aspx?mode=silent&
source= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.law.com%2Fthelegalintelligencer%2F2019%2F07
%2F18%2Fkrasner-says-pa-s-death-penalty-is-unconstitutional-heres-what-pa-s-chiefjustice-has-said%2F [permalink unavailable] (“A review of the chief justice’s writings shows that on several occasions Saylor has questioned the way the state’s capital punishment system has been implemented, and has been critical of the quality
of representation by court-appointed attorneys.”).
147. See Dominique Mosbergen, Death Penalty Is Racist, Classist and Unconstitutional, Philadelphia DA Argues, HUFFINGTON POST, (Aug 22, 2019), https://www.huff
post.com/entry/philadelphia-district-attorney-death-penalty_n_5d2d88bde4b085
eda5a12305 [https://perma.cc/58BN-748J] (explaining arguments made by Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner in his brief opposing the death penalty as
applied in Pennsylvania). As part of the brief, District Attorney Krasner conducted
a study of 155 death row inmates to analyze disparities or flaws in the application
of the death penalty in Philadelphia. Id. Another article cited to the legislative
study conducted by a joint task force on the capital punishment system in Pennsylvania and analyzed the King’s Bench petitions filed to “leapfrog the typical [legislative] process.” Riley Yates, Could the Supreme Court Kill Pennsylvania’s Death
Penalty?, MORNING CALL (Mar. 5, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.mcall.com/news/
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cise King’s Bench, petitioners argued that the decision has sweeping effects on the integrity of the judiciary’s capital punishment system and thus
meets typical King’s Bench criterion.148 Conversely, respondents argued
that the court should not invoke its King’s Bench powers because there
was no issue of immediate public importance given the existing moratorium on the death penalty.149
The court declined to exercise King’s Bench powers to hear the appeal, stating in a per curiam order that the review of death penalty proceedings should continue accordingly in PCRA court.150 The court’s
denial may serve as a signal to petitioners that there is no urgency in
resolving the issue; it places even greater faith in the judiciary’s present
system of reviewing death penalty sentences.151 The court’s order exemplifies the caution justices exercise when deciding King’s Bench petitions—even for an issue potentially warranting resolution.
police/mc-nws-pennsylvania-death-penalty-supreme-court-20190304-story.html
[https://perma.cc/A6TR-SNJP] (discussing potential for using King’s Bench to
abolish death penalty). Commentators were unsure whether the justices would be
convinced by both the arguments for King’s Bench and on the merits of the issue.
See Mitchell, supra note 146.
148. See Cherri Gregg, Advocates Argue Pennsylvania Supreme Court Should Toss
Death Penalty, KYW NEWSRADIO (Sept. 11, 2019, 2:33 PM), https://kywnewsradio
.radio.com/articles/news/advocates-argue-pa-supreme-court-should-toss-deathpenalty [https://perma.cc/5P6M-MTRN] (detailing arguments both petitioners
and respondents made during oral arguments for King’s Bench). Several justices
expressed concerns about the lack of factual record in the matter—and if the
court decided on the merits of the death penalty—it would have to adopt the
Pennsylvania Task Force and Advisory Committee’s report on the death penalty as
fact. See id.; see also Pennsylvania Supreme Court Hears Argument on Constitutionality of
Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Sept. 12, 2019), https://deathpenalty
info.org/news/pennsylvania-supreme-court-hears-argument-on-constitutionalityof-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/6ZYD-VJ9H] (highlighting respondents’ argument that task force’s report was only meant for advisory purposes and not to be
accepted as fact).
149. See Logan Hullinger, Hill-Evans and Others Wait as Pa. Supreme Court Hears
Death Penalty Challenge, YORK DISPATCH, https://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/
news/local/2019/09/04/hill-evans-and-others-wait-pa-supreme-court-hearsargu
ment-over-death-penalty-constitutionality-next/2199162001/ [https://perma.cc/
238W-N875] (last updated Sept. 8, 2019, 5:46 PM) (explaining how long moratorium has existed on death penalty).
150. Cox v. Commonwealth, 218 A.3d 384, 385 (Pa. 2019); see also Maryclaire
Dale, Pa. High Court Says It Won’t Review State’s Death Penalty, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2019/09/pa-high-court-says-it-wont-review-statesdeath-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/5ACD-MF4E] (last updated Sept. 28, 2019)
(stating Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to exercise King’s Bench to review constitutionality of death penalty).
151. See Cox, 218 A.3d at 385 (refusing to exercise jurisdiction). In its ruling,
the court reiterated normal appeals of the death penalty should continue in lower
tribunals. See Julie Shaw, Pa. Supreme Court Rejects Petition to Find Death Penalty Unconstitutional, PHILA. INQUIRER, https://www.inquirer.com/news/pennsylvaniadeath-penalty-supreme-court-ruling-philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-krasner20190927.html [permalink unavailable] (last updated Sept. 27, 2019) (commenting on Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association’s statement backing death penalty as applied in Pennsylvania).
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D. The Mumia Abu-Jamal Case
In 1982, Mumia Abu-Jamal, a famous member of the Black Panther
Party, was convicted for shooting and killing former Philadelphia police
officer Daniel Faulkner.152 A jury sentenced Abu-Jamal to death despite
Abu-Jamal arguing there was racial bias in his judicial proceedings.153
Abu-Jamal is a prominent figure in the “Free Mumia” movement, which
advocates for racial justice in the judiciary.154
In 2011, former Philadelphia District Attorney Seth Williams decided
to no longer pursue Abu-Jamal’s execution and stated that he would be
imprisoned for life.155 By that point, Abu-Jamal had spent nearly thirty
years on death row, during which time he fought against racial injustice
through his writing and advocacy.156 It was not until the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania 157 that Abu-Jamal and his legal
team had an opportunity to appeal his prison sentence.158 The Williams
decision stated that former Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Chief Justice
Castille’s failure to recuse himself from a decision denying relief to a
death row inmate violated the prisoner’s due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.159 The former justice’s role in adjudicating the
decision presented a risk of bias because he played a significant part in
152. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 555 A.2d 846, 848 (Pa. 1989) (reviewing
actions leading to Abu-Jamal’s imprisonment); see also Wesley Lowery, How Mumia
Abu-Jamal Doomed Debo Adegbile in the Senate, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2014, 3:56 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/05/how-mumiaabu-jamal-doomed-dego-adegbile/ [https://perma.cc/KM5W-J3C2] (explaining
how Mumia Abu-Jamal’s conviction and story has remained a political talking
point for politicians as recently as 2012).
153. See Abu-Jamal, 555 A.2d at 848–49 (laying out Abu-Jamal’s argument that
he presented sufficient evidence of racial animus in his judicial proceedings).
154. See Don Terry, A Fight for Life Is Waged in an Angry Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES:
ARCHIVE (July 30, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/30/us/a-fight-forlife-is-waged-in-an-angry-courtroom.html [https://perma.cc/CT2J-3JJ3].
155. The Abu-Jamal Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2011), https://www.nytimes.
com/2011/12/13/opinion/the-abu-jamal-case.html [https://perma.cc/L8YYW9WE] (showing district attorney’s decision to “put the case to rest”); see also
Wash. Wire, Explaining the Mumia Abu-Jamal Controversy, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2014,
5:02 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/03/05/explaining-the-mumiaabu-jamal-case/ [https://perma.cc/S9YX-T929] (noting Abu-Jamal is now serving
life in prison without possibility of parole).
156. See Neil Genzlinger, An Insistent Voice From Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
31, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/movies/mumia-long-distancerevolutionary-about-mumia-abu-jamal.html [https://perma.cc/CQ2W-XSBA]
(highlighting Abu-Jamal’s writing from death row).
157. 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016).
158. See Bobby Allyn, Mumia Abu-Jamal Granted Right of Appeal After Decades in
Prison, NPR (Dec. 28, 2018, 5:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/28/
680781150/mumia-abu-jamal-granted-right-of-appeal-after-decades-in-prison
[https://perma.cc/HQ63-ZHCG] (stating Abu-Jamal’s main argument in most recent appeal centered around potential bias of former Chief Justice Castille as revealed in Williams).
159. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1903.
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Williams’s prosecution when formerly working at the District Attorney’s
office.160 This ruling prompted Abu-Jamal to appeal his conviction because the same former chief justice denied Abu-Jamal’s final appeal in
2012.161
Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner initially opposed Abu-Jamal’s most recent appeal after it was allowed to proceed by Judge Leon
Tucker in the Court of Common Pleas.162 Krasner received substantial
blowback for the move, and months later, he reversed his position and
allowed the appeal to proceed.163 This prompted Maureen Faulkner, the
widow of Daniel Faulkner, to file a King’s Bench petition asking the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to review Abu-Jamal’s appeal.164 Faulkner
claimed that District Attorney Krasner and several staffers in the District
Attorney’s office should no longer be involved with Abu-Jamal’s case because they had conflicts of interest.165
On February 24, 2020, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted
Maureen Faulkner’s King’s Bench petition.166 The court appointed McKean County Court of Common Pleas Senior Judge John Cleland as Special Master to investigate whether District Attorney Krasner and others
have conflicts of interest with Abu-Jamal’s case.167 This aggressive step is
160. See id. at 1908.
161. See Steve Tawa, Philly DA Will Not Pursue Appeal in Mumia Abu-Jamal Legal
Saga, KYW NEWSRADIO (Apr. 17, 2019, 5:33 PM), https://kywnewsradio.radio.com/
articles/news/da-withdraws-appeal-judges-ruling-granting-mumia-abu-jamal-rehear
ing-state-supreme [https://perma.cc/ZJR5-UNUA] (stating Abu-Jamal’s appeal
“centers on the [f]ormer Chief Justice[’s]” involvement in the prosecution).
162. See Bobby Allyn, Judge in Mumia Abu-Jamal’s Case Blasts Krasner for Trying to
Block Latest Appeal, WHYY (Apr. 1, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/judge-inmumia-abu-jamals-case-blasts-krasner-for-trying-to-block-latest-appeal/ [https://
perma.cc/M34E-FERM] (examining lawyers from district attorney’s office who initially opposed Abu-Jamal’s argument that former Justice Castille was biased in
case).
163. Bobby Allyn, Krasner Reverses Position, No Longer Opposes New Hearing for
Mumia Abu-Jamal, WHYY (Apr. 17, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/krasnerreverses-position-no-longer-opposes-new-hearing-for-mumia-abu-jamal/ [https://
perma.cc/A7UX-MRSE].
164. Julie Shaw, Pa. Supreme Court Will Investigate Alleged Conflicts in DA Larry
Krasner’s Handling of Mumia Abu-Jamal’s Appeals, PHILA. INQUIRER, https://
www.inquirer.com/news/mumia-abu-jamal-maureen-faulkner-pennsylvania-su
preme-court-conflict-larry-krasner-20200224.html [permalink unavailable] (last updated Feb. 24, 2020) (claiming Faulkner asked court to remove Krasner and his
office from Abu-Jamal matter due to conflicts of interest between Krasner and his
staff).
165. Id. (explaining Krasner is associated with organization where Abu-Jamal
is an active board member). Faulker alleged that Krasner, among other “movement attorneys,” defended protestors outside the 2000 Republican National Convention in Philadelphia who showed support for Abu-Jamal. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
166. Id.
167. See Needles, supra note 19 (detailing Judge Cleland’s past history as special master in “Kids for Cash” scandal and Penn State football sex abuse scandal).
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another high-profile example of the court’s willingness to insert itself to
investigate potential injustices.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA SHOULD CONTINUE
KING’S BENCH POWERS IN APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES

TO

USE

While commentators, delegates, and jurists have argued King’s Bench
powers are too powerful for the supreme court to wield, King’s Bench
should remain a mechanism that the court uses to ensure judicial integrity.168 Recent oral arguments show how the legislature has cautioned the
court against using King’s Bench were they believe power is reserved for
the legislature.169 Legislators should be cognizant of the positive impact
the powers continue to have in the commonwealth.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has effectively used King’s Bench
to fulfill its judicial oversight obligation even when other outlets for review
exist.170 Even though there is no set criteria for using King’s Bench, the
court gives ample weight to precedent and exhibits caution when deciding
whether to use King’s Bench.171 Therefore, under the proper circumstances—such as when the court feels the integrity of the judiciary is
threatened—it should be empowered to invoke King’s Bench powers.
Legislatures and lower courts should honor the powers granted to the
seven elected justices so long as the courts continue to selectively grant

168. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 701 (Pa. 2014) (Todd, J., concurring) (stating King’s Bench should be reserved for “constitutionally complex and delicate
area[s]”). The legislature created the 1993 amendments, including the CJD, due
to public disapproval of the supreme court’s powers. See id. (Todd, J., concurring).
Justice McCaffery found the powers were not infallible and reminded the court of
its failure to immediately interject in the “Kids for Cash” scandal when it denied an
initial King’s Bench petition. See id. at 705–06 (McCaffery, J., concurring) (arguing against supreme court’s contention that King’s Bench provides swift justice if
invoked).
169. See Editorial Board, Opinion, Death-Penalty Case at the State Supreme Court
Is a Reminder That Harrisburg Lawmakers Not Doing Their Job, PHILA. INQUIRER, https:/
/www.inquirer.com/opinion/editorials/death-penalty-pennsylvania-supremecourt-cox-philadelphia-joseph-scarnati-20190913.html [permalink unavailable]
(last updated Sept. 13, 2019, 2:16 PM) (explaining goal of Joint State Commission’s report on capital punishment system). The Office of Pennsylvania State Senate President Pro Tempore Joe Scarnati argued the court’s use of King’s Bench to
hear the case would disincentivize the legislature from creating these types of reports going forward. Id.
170. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 681–82 (opining CJD did not curtail oversight
authority of supreme court, thus, remained within supreme court’s purview); In re
Franciscus, 369 A.2d 1190, 1191–92 (Pa. 1977) (clarifying article V, section 18 of
Pennsylvania constitution detailing removal of members of judiciary did not eliminate authority of supreme court in oversight matters).
171. For a discussion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s latest decisions
to exercise King’s Bench, and its rationale for doing so, see supra Sections III.A–D.
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petitions.172 The Mumia Abu-Jamal appeal currently being reviewed by a
King’s Bench-appointed special master reflects this importance.173
A. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Should Rely on Historical
King’s Bench Usage
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania should invoke King’s Bench
under the proper circumstances because it has shown caution in its previous uses. These circumstances include remedying judicial misconduct or
decisions the supreme court needs to expedite.174 One of the most valuable resources the court has when deciding whether to exercise King’s
Bench is its precedent.175 The Judiciary Act of 1722 established many important functions of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including King’s
Bench powers.176 Without relying on its historically flexible interpretation
of King’s Bench, the court would not have been able to effectively craft a
remedy for situations like the “Kids for Cash” scandal.177
172. See Aldisert, supra note 23, at 486 (elaborating on innate powers of King’s
Bench and importance of preserving it). In a tribute to former Chief Justice Ralph
Cappy, the Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert said how important King’s Bench powers are for the supreme court. See id. (stating “unabashed power to make law”
allows supreme court to move around typical statutory legislation and enact law);
see also Makosky, supra note 6, at 700 (opining Pennsylvania should not try to eliminate or limit King’s Bench because of its value).
173. See Shaw, supra note 164 (illustrating the importance of investigating
threats to justice including conflicts of interest).
174. See, e.g., In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 682–83 (arguing that King’s Bench usage
is “essential and continuing”); Sean P. Mahoney & Ciaran B. Way, PA Supreme Court
Denies “King’s Bench” Petition to Consolidate All COVID-19 Business Interruption Cases
Pending in State Court, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP (May 14, 2020), https://www.white
andwilliams.com/resources-alerts-PA-Supreme-Court-Denies-Kings-Bench-Petitionto-Consolidate-All-COVID-19-Business-Interruption-Cases-Pending-in-StateCourt.html [https://perma.cc/ZA87-723G] (discussing court’s denial of King’s
Bench petition challenging COVID-19 business interruptions).
175. See, e.g., In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 674–77 (collecting cases where supreme
court has used King’s Bench); In re Assignment of Avellino, 690 A.2d 1138,
1140–41 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting argument supreme court could not assume jurisdiction even without a matter pending in lower court); Carpentertown Coal & Coke
Co. v. Laird, 61 A.2d 426, 429 (citing Commonwealth v. Balph, 3 A. 220, 230 (Pa.
1886)) (utilizing holding from Balph to conclude writ of prohibition does not
have to be issued using original jurisdiction); Makosky, supra note 6, at 686–93
(listing several instances where court has relied on its King’s Bench).
176. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 528 (explaining creation and powers of supreme court in Pennsylvania); id. at 528 n.19 (showing England’s possession over
right to appeal from Supreme Court of Pennsylvania). For further discussion of
the origins of King’s Bench, the original intent of the King’s Bench in Pennsylvania, and its subsequent changes, see supra Section II.A.
177. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 670–71 (explaining how court has made use
of King’s Bench in past). The court detailed when King’s Bench powers usually
come into play—in situations where the court must “supplement existing procedural processes that have proven inadequate.” Id. at 670. With this flexible framework, the court almost described King’s Bench as a last resort remedy, and with
that, remedied the “Kids for Cash” scandal. See id. at 671, 675 (explaining why past
examples of King’s Bench usage are important to consider).
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Notably, any time the court has previously invoked King’s Bench, it
has been careful to explain why an issue, case, or decision requires use of
the powers.178 Conversely, if the court declines a King’s Bench petition, it
does not need to justify its decision.179 A simple denial would likely serve
as a signal the court already recognizes that it should not use King’s Bench
without a compelling justification.180 This is evidenced from its decision
in Cox to deny a King’s Bench petition in the capital punishment
controversy.
Further, the court should avoid serving as the fact finder when exercising King’s Bench powers.181 As evidenced in the Mumia Abu-Jamal
case, the court is more willing to appoint a special master to conduct fact
finding.182 The justices have delegated this responsibility before choosing
to hear the case on appeal.183 Although the current King’s Bench function is not identical to its original function in English law, it serves a useful
role when the court is willing to rely on other judicial functions in the
process.184
178. See id. at 674–77 (reviewing situations where King’s Bench was utilized
and why); see also Mitchell, supra note 5 (explaining how King’s Bench powers are
limited to use in urgent circumstances). When asked about what situations qualify
for King’s Bench, former Chief Justice Castille stated, “the court should not take
publicity of a case into consideration when deciding whether to exercise [the]
powers.” Mitchell, supra note 5.
179. See Cox v. Commonwealth, 218 A.3d 384, 385 (Pa. 2019) (declining to
exercise King’s Bench without explanation). Because a moratorium existed on the
death penalty in Pennsylvania, some justices signaled during oral arguments there
may not exist the pressing issue of immediate importance the court typically saves
King’s Bench for. See Maryclaire Dale, Pennsylvania High Court Asked to Throw Out
Death Penalty, MORNING CALL (Sept. 11, 2019, 5:33 PM), https://www.mcall.com/
news/breaking/mc-nws-pa-supreme-court-asked-to-throw-out-death-penalty-201909
11-uudtb6qxsbh6bpfdzvtklaswti-story.html [https://perma.cc/3Y3M-PL6S] (recalling Justice Todd’s line of questioning of whether particular case met urgency requirement because of moratorium on death penalty).
180. Compare Cox, 218 A.3d at 385 (denying King’s Bench jurisdiction without
explanation), with In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 674–77 (providing details for its reasons
to invoke King’s Bench jurisdiction).
181. See Makosky, supra note 6, at 697 (recommending supreme court not act
as fact finder in King’s Bench cases). Acting as an individual fact finder could
devalue the intent behind King’s Bench unless the supreme court is forced to decide an emergency matter. See Benjamin Pontz, A Ruling Can Come As Soon As This
Week in Legal Standoff Between Wolf and Pa. Legislature, PA. POST (June 22, 2020,
12:12 PM), https://papost.org/2020/06/22/a-ruling-could-come-as-soon-as-thisweek-in-legal-standoff-between-wolf-and-pa-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/CL227L5X] (explaining how the court must adjudicate COVID-19 dispute in emergency
fashion). Even then, the court still has elected to use any tools available to it in the
judiciary to conduct expedited and efficient fact-finding. See supra Section III.B
(discussing court’s choice to appoint Special Master in “Kids for Cash” scandal).
182. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text (highlighting court’s
choice to appoint special master in Abu-Jamal case).
183. See, e.g., supra Section III.B (discussing special master in “Kids for Cash”
scandal).
184. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 535–37 (asserting King’s Bench functions in
Pennsylvania far beyond what early eighteenth-century Pennsylvania legislators in-
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Through careful selection of cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has utilized King’s Bench in ways that have been valuable.185 The
court has not used the powers as a weapon to overrule cases it disagrees
with, but has furthered its own obligations under article V.186 This is evidenced by the court’s recent denial of King’s Bench to determine the constitutionality of the death penalty in the commonwealth.187 The
Pennsylvania legislature should be aware of the positive impact—an impact that the legislature would not be able to provide using its article II
powers—King’s Bench decisions have had in the judicial system.188 The
court also has explained how other judicial bodies can coexist with King’s
Bench.189 In addition to the other judicial bodies, other avenues remain
besides King’s Bench for the supreme court to use to cure injustice.190
Therefore, removal of King’s Bench is unnecessary and would alter the
historical balance of power for the supreme court.191
B. The Court Maintains Deference to Other Judicial Bodies
While critics have argued King’s Bench serves as a mechanism for judicial overreach, reliance on the powers is called for only in extreme circumstances.192 This is why the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania puts faith
tended); id. (stating King’s Bench function has transformed into one not originally
intended by those enacting it).
185. For further discussion of recent examples of how the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has used King’s Bench, see supra Part III.
186. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 675 (Pa. 2014) (explaining how King’s
Bench allows court to fulfill its article V responsibilities). To ensure King’s Bench
powers are not used as a weapon, the supreme court reiterates the powers are to be
“exercised with extreme caution.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199,
1206 (Pa. 2015) (explaining process court must engage in to properly exercise
King’s Bench powers).
187. For further discussion of the court’s decision to decline King’s Bench
jurisdiction to hear the capital punishment challenge, see supra Section III.C.
188. See Makosky, supra note 6, at 686–87 (commenting on multitude of instances where supreme court has used its King’s Bench abilities to protect public).
King’s Bench could serve as a mechanism for bypassing the lengthy procedural or
litigation process to make instant change, but the court must not encroach too far
on the ability of the elected representatives. See id. at 679, 686. Further, the supreme court has utilized King’s Bench in areas where the legislature has enacted
laws subject to variable interpretation by lower courts. Id. at 689–90 (listing three
examples of cases court clarified using King’s Bench).
189. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 685–88 (explaining how lower disciplinary
courts exist alongside supreme court’s appellate authority).
190. For further discussion on the similarities and differences of King’s Bench
and extraordinary jurisdiction, see supra Section II.C.
191. See Makosky, supra note 6, at 700 (“The Legislature . . . should not attempt to fix what is not broken.”).
192. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199, 1206 (Pa. 2015) (stating
King’s Bench is typically relied on in situations of time-sensitive public importance
where procedural delay would be harmful).
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in other judicial and legislative bodies to resolve issues.193 Even though
the court’s King’s Bench powers supersede any judicial discipline committee, groups like the CJD and JCB oversee issues similar to those that the
supreme court has decided using King’s Bench.194
The supreme court has clarified it still has power over other bodies
when reviewing cases involving judicial misconduct.195 The supreme
court deserves to hold its prescribed King’s Bench authority, but it does
not need to be the only court tasked with maintaining integrity in the
judiciary because other courts address disciplinary issues.196 Recently, the
supreme court has relied on the lower courts to adjudicate PCRA appeals
instead of immediately deciding them using King’s Bench.197 One justice
on the court believes more power should be placed in lower courts, such
193. See, e.g., Cox v. Commonwealth, 218 A.3d 384, 385 (Pa. 2019) (declining
to exercise King’s Bench jurisdiction and allowing individual claims to proceed
within limitations of other tribunals). Denial of King’s Bench effectively showed
the supreme court trusted other judicial bodies to properly adjudicate death penalty appeals. See George Ferko, Opinion, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Is Right to Reject
Petition Against Death Penalty, PHILA. INQUIRER, https://www.inquirer.com/opin
ion/commentary/pennsylvania-death-penalty-supreme-court-petition-jurisdiction20190927.html [permalink unavailable] (last updated Sept. 27, 2019, 1:19 PM)
(explaining why people of Pennsylvania should decide through legislature whether
death penalty should exist, and not seven supreme court justices).
194. See PA. CONST. art. V. §§ 18(a) (outlining independent board of judicial
branch, the JCB, and composition of members); 18(b) (detailing requirements
and members of CJD). The Judicial Conduct Board is responsible for filing
charges against members of the judiciary, while the CJD adjudicates the dispute.
See id. §§ 18(a)–(b).
195. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 679 (Pa. 2014) (opining supervisory authority over courts extends past forms of procedure). The court challenged petitioners’ reliance on legislative debate concerning article V section 18 and whether
it stripped the supreme court of the ability to act where the Board of Judicial Discipline or CJD might act. See id. at 681 n.25. According to the court, the CJD can
take action, but the supreme court had a far broad ability to act using King’s
Bench. Id. at 683 n.26.
196. See Jonathan P. Nase, Pennsylvania’s Evolving Judicial Discipline System: The
Development and Content of the 1993 Constitutional Amendments, 98 DICK. L. REV. 429,
449 (1994) (explaining how 1993 amendments to Pennsylvania constitution allowed other judicial bodies to operate more independently from supreme court).
The amendments called the supreme court’s disciplinary authority into question
with newer available courts being implemented. See id. at 449 n.140.
197. See 20 WEST’S PA. PRACTICE, APPELLATE PRACTICE § 10:23, Westlaw
(database updated 2020) (noting supreme court has already declared it unnecessary in certain instances to bypass statutory jurisdiction of traditional PCRA court
appeal); Commonwealth v. Porter, 728 A.2d 890, 893–94 (Pa. 1999) (declining
petitioner’s request for King’s Bench relief because court had previously assumed
jurisdiction of matter through post-conviction relief procedure). Although limited
in analysis, the supreme court issued a per curiam statement in Cox suggesting
normal death penalty convictions should be appealed through PCRA courts instead of being directly challenged using King’s Bench. See Cox, 218 A.3d at 385
(Pa. 2019) (declining to exercising King’s Bench powers to hear merits of challenge to death penalty).
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as the CJD, to draw conclusions.198 Through careful deliberation, the legislature formed these judicial bodies to address misconduct or unfairness
in the judicial system.199 The court should trust these judiciary bodies to
preserve the people’s trust in the judiciary, but at the same time, it should
not override the inherent authority of King’s Bench.200 But when the
court feels the need to insert itself, it has the supervisory power to do so.
C. The Danger of Removing King’s Bench Powers
Despite the positive impact of King’s Bench, the legislature still has
the ability to eliminate it altogether.201 Some commentators have argued
King’s Bench powers are not inherent, and the legislature is able to eliminate parts or all of King’s Bench through constitutional ratification.202
Others suggest that, because article V of the commonwealth’s constitution
enumerates the supreme court’s powers, the court cannot possess powers
beyond those in the text.203 On the other hand, some believe the historical interpretation of King’s Bench shows the powers transcend even those
198. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 696 (Saylor, J., concurring) (recommending
in cases similar to suspension of Judge Bruno that CJD’s decision should be given
more authority). Chief Justice Saylor currently sits on the supreme court, and in
his concurrence, he argued the CJD is “better equipped” to fact find, draw conclusions, and create consistent orders between the court and other tribunals. Id. (believing majority’s decision would leave public questioning whether JCB serves a
valid purpose).
199. See Nase, supra note 196, at 446–49 (discussing legislature’s eventual decision to form judicial bodies in article V section 18).
200. See id. at 449 (showing 1993 amendments provide avenues for judicial
bodies to alleviate some responsibility of supreme court and act independently
from it).
201. See Sherer, supra note 7, at 533–34 (describing Convention’s debate over
scope and existence of King’s Bench). For discussion of the 1968 Pennsylvania
Constitutional Convention and its debate over whether to remove the powers of
King’s Bench, see supra Section II.B.
202. Compare In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 676 (Pa. 2014) (citing Stander v. Kelley,
250 A.2d 474, 487 (Pa. 1969) (Roberts, J., concurring)) (indicating even the Legislature does not possess the power to remove, impair, or interfere with the supreme
court’s King’s Bench authority), and Makosky, supra note 6, at 700 (“The interference by the Legislature . . . likely will be considered unconstitutional by the supreme court . . . .”), with Ledewitz, supra note 20, at 411–12 (arguing King’s Bench
powers are not inherent and can be removed).
203. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A. 3d 1199, 1219–20 (Pa. 2015) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasizing legislature’s ability and duty to make law, and
other two branch’s inability to nullify it); see also In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 681 (stating elimination of King’s Bench must be “expressed or necessarily implied” from
commonwealth constitution in order for supreme court to not give it effect). Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Williams highlighted the importance of separation of
powers, why the legislature is responsible for the law, and why the legislature
should not be “nullifi[ed] . . . by fiat by the [j]udiciary.” Williams, 129 A.3d at
1220.
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enumerated in the constitution.204 Regardless, the only way King’s Bench
powers should be changed is through legislation that ratifies the law. The
legislature’s ability to do this is rooted in article II of the constitution.205
But the legislature should recognize that King’s Bench allows the commonwealth to address issues that often cannot be resolved efficiently by
any other branch of government. Its unique function helps bring resolution some of the most difficult matters the government faces.206
Commentators and former justices have argued the powers are inherent and too transcendent to be altered. If the supreme court is entrusted
with jurisdiction in article V “as provided by law,” it should be subject to
the bounds set forth by law.207 If the legislature made changes to King’s
Bench powers, the court would be limited in its ability to protect its own
authority.208 But any decision by the legislature to restrict or eliminate
King’s Bench would be against the history and tradition of the commonwealth.209 The supreme court has used King’s Bench powers cautiously to
clarify issues, rectify systemic problems, or remedy injustice that extends
beyond one ruling.210
D. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Correctly Exercised King’s Bench
in the Mumia Abu-Jamal Case
The exercise of King’s Bench authority will remain in the legal spotlight in the short term. For instance, the current COVID-19 pandemic has
forced the court to decide whether Governor Tom Wolf’s executive orders
violate the constitutional rights of various businesses.211 Also, the supreme court’s decision in League of Women Voters to use closely related extraordinary jurisdiction could offer other states guidance in deciding
204. See Stander, 250 A.2d at 426–27 (Roberts, J., concurring) (stating interpretation of “law” should be beyond law of the constitution, and prevent supreme
court’s powers from being limited by legislature).
205. See PA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (granting lawmaking power to general assembly
of Pennsylvania); In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 681 (explaining that only way to effectively remove King’s Bench powers is through constitutional amendment).
206. See Mahoney & Way, supra note 3 (giving the court the expedited opportunity to determine the validity and constitutionality of Governor Wolf’s COVID-19
executive orders).
207. PA. CONST. art. V, § 2(c). But see In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 669 (“[T]he
Court may employ any type of process or procedure necessary for the
circumstances.”).
208. Compare Ledewitz, supra note 20, at 411–12 (combating statements made
by former supreme court justices that any revocation of inherent power by limiting
or manipulating article V could be declared unconstitutional), with Makosky, supra
note 6, at 678 (arguing supreme court would declare any constitutional amendment limiting or abolishing King’s Bench powers to be unconstitutional).
209. For further discussion of the history of King’s Bench in Pennsylvania, see
supra Sections II.A–B.
210. For examples of when the supreme court has decided King’s Bench powers are necessary to use, see supra Section III.C.
211. See Mahoney & Way, supra note 3.
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political gerrymandering issues.212 Even further, the famous rapper Meek
Mill’s legal proceedings sparked a King’s Bench discussion among his fans
following his ongoing criminal justice battle.213 King’s Bench powers allowed the court to step in and grant the rapper’s bail after a Court of
Common Pleas judge resentenced him for a probation violation, sparking
national controversy.214 A broad interpretation of King’s Bench allows
the court to efficiently rectify complex cases like Meek Mill’s.215
The ongoing legal battle for Mumia Abu-Jamal is another example
where the supreme court correctly exercised King’s Bench powers.216 The
issue has drawn national media attention to a high-profile figure respected
among racial equality advocates.217 It has also drawn attention to Maureen Faulker, who has emerged as an advocate for crime victims’ families.218 The supreme court has been willing to exercise jurisdiction any
time it believes the judiciary’s integrity has come into question, and these
circumstances reflect the need to intervene.219 The court mimicked its
approach from the “Kids for Cash” scandal by appointing a special
212. See Editorial Board, Opinion, Eric Holder’s Gerrymander Doctrine, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 19, 2019, 7:13 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/eric-holders-gerryman
der-doctrine-11574122412 [permalink unavailable] (acknowledging supreme
court’s decision in League of Women Voters could provide a blueprint for future state
appellate courts to address political gerrymandering problems in country). For a
further discussion extraordinary jurisdiction and its similarities to invoking King’s
Bench, see supra Section II.C.
213. See Mitchell, supra note 5 (discussing disagreement among legal profession as to exercise of King’s Bench in Meek Mill’s case).
214. See Elahe Izado & Sonia Rao, Meek Mill to Be Released From Prison After
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Orders That He Be Granted Bail, WASH. POST (Apr. 24,
2018, 5:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/
wp/2018/04/24/pennsylvania-supreme-court-orders-meek-mill-immediately-begranted-bail/ [https://perma.cc/PG64-9EUR] (explaining situation causing rapper’s legal battle to enter national spotlight).
215. For discussion of why the supreme court should lean on the broad historical interpretation of King’s Bench, see supra Section IV.A.
216. For background on the Abu-Jamal appeal, see supra Section III.D.
217. See Lowery, supra note 152 (noting how Abu-Jamal became an internationally recognized figure following his arrest); see also Allyn, supra note 158 (“The
movement to ‘Free Mumia’ reverberated around the world over the decades, with
thousands donating to his legal defense fund. Buttons and posters bearing his face
became the symbols of a criminal justice system that critics view as being rigged
and treating African-American with indifference.”).
218. See George Parry, Opinion, Removing DA Krasner From Mumia Abu-Jamal
Case Would Be a Step Forward for Victims and Their Families, PHILA. INQUIRER, https://
www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/maureen-faulkner-mumia-linda-schellen
ger-larry-krasner-20191114.html [permalink unavailable] (last updated Nov. 14,
2019, 1:51 PM) (arguing Faulkner’s ability to highlight Krasner’s agenda shows
Krasner “depriv[es] crime victims, their loved ones, and the public at large” of
justice under law).
219. See, e.g., FREE MUMIA, http://www.freemumia.com [https://perma.cc/
R3T9-7Q9V] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) (alleging problem of racial bias in judicial
proceedings).
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master.220 The decision to appoint a fact finder is not uncommon, as the
court appointed a fact finder who has had prior experience as a special
master.221
The court uses King’s Bench subjectively and is responsible for how
far its powers extend. Nevertheless, the Abu-Jamal case meets every requirement the supreme court traditionally considers when deciding
whether King’s Bench powers are needed.222 Like In re Bruno, the controversy surrounds someone tasked with fairly upholding the rule of law.223
Like In re Petitions of Bell, Abu-Jamal’s case raises questions of misconduct
within the judicial system.224 The supreme court would not effectively fulfill its judicial oversight obligation if it did not investigate District Attorney
Krasner’s alleged conflict of interest.
Further, the Abu-Jamal case surrounds one of the most controversial
issues in the Pennsylvania judiciary—the death penalty.225 Last year, the
court declined a King’s Bench petition concerning the constitutionality of
the death penalty in the commonwealth.226 Abu-Jamal’s appeal could
cause a rise in the number of capital punishment appeals claiming racial
bias.227 This has been acknowledged by District Attorney Krasner’s team,
who stated that the reason they dropped their challenge to Abu-Jamal’s
appeal was their belief that “long-settled convictions in other cases will not
be disturbed.”228
Abu-Jamal’s case illustrates why King’s Bench powers are necessary in
the presence of potential wrongdoing. It exemplifies how the court takes
special care to allow only limited use of King’s Bench and how it tradition220. See Needles, supra note 19 (discussing how special master appointed in
Abu-Jamal case had significant role in “Kids for Cash” scandal).
221. See id.
222. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 674–77 (Pa. 2014) (detailing reasons court
might exercise King’s Bench jurisdiction); see also Shaw, supra note 164 (highlighting court’s invocation of King’s Bench to investigate conflicts of interest in AbuJamal case).
223. For further discussion of the controversy in In re Bruno, see supra Section
III.A. Additionally, for a further discussion of District Attorney Krasner’s alleged
conflict of interest in the Abu-Jamal case, see supra Section III.D.
224. For a further discussion of the In re Petitions of Bell decision to exercise
King’s Bench, see supra Section II.A.
225. For further discussion of other capital punishment cases where the court
exercised King’s Bench, specifically, the Williams opinion, see supra Section III.A.
226. For further discussion on the court’s decision to decline King’s Bench
jurisdiction to assess death penalty, see supra Section III.C.
227. See Michael D’Onofrio, D.A. Krasner Drops Appeal in Mumia Abu-Jamal
Case, PHILA. TRIBUNE (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.phillytrib.com/news/local_
news/d-a-krasner-drops-appeal-in-mumia-abu-jamal-case/article_65fce931-8ab2-5
aad-8749-657b631d3cd6.html [https://perma.cc/PJP2-AHZ7] (noting District Attorney’s office feared hundreds of capital appeals claiming racial bias).
228. Id. (showing District Attorney Krasner reversed original position after
clarification from Judge Leon Tucker’s original opinion).
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ally avoids acting as a fact finder.229 Regardless of whether the court decides to prevent District Attorney Krasner from being involved in AbuJamal’s appeal, it took a necessary step by granting King’s Bench to resolve
an issue important to many people.
V. LOOKING AHEAD: THE FUTURE IMPACT

OF THE

KING’S BENCH

As king of the commonwealth’s judiciary, the supreme court will likely
have numerous future petitions seeking King’s Bench review. The court
will likely hear from the special master appointed in the Mumia Abu-Jamal
appeal this year.230 The decision will not only have implications on AbuJamal’s chances of future appeal, but also will have implications on District
Attorney Krasner’s record as an impartial prosecutor.231
The supreme court has supplied lower tribunals and legal commentators with many reasons why King’s Bench should be used in some circumstances.232 The court has also emphasized its cautious approach to using
King’s Bench and why certain instances do not require it.233 The debate
surrounding King’s Bench and whether it is a valid function of the supreme court will continue to be discussed.
Supreme court justices are chosen in partisan elections and serve tenyear terms.234 Therefore, it is up to the people to decide who will have
King’s Bench power. Courts are generally subject to scrutiny of engaging
in judicial overreach in instances where individuals of a particular political
ideology do not agree with the outcome, so King’s Bench decisions made
by elected judges must be particularly.235 To combat this, the supreme
229. For a further discussion of how the court has avoided acting as a fact
finder in King’s Bench proceedings, see supra Section IV.A.
230. See Needles, supra note 19 (stating special master has until June to complete his investigation and until August to submit findings and make recommendations to supreme court).
231. Shaw, supra note 164 (explaining District Attorney Krasner’s potential
conflict of interest as prosecutor).
232. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 224 (Pa. 1999) (declining to
exercise King’s Bench and deferring to PCRA court authority); Commonwealth v.
Porter, 728 A.2d 890, 893–94 (Pa. 1999) (choosing not to exercise King’s Bench
because matter was already before supreme court and was unnecessary to do so
again); Commonwealth v. Appel, 689 A.2d 891, 909 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting King’s
Bench because petitioners already brought forth issue before supreme court).
233. For an analysis of the supreme court’s reasoning behind exercising
King’s Bench jurisdiction, even with lower tribunals’ capabilities to adjudicate the
matters, see supra Section III.A.
234. See 42. PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3131(a) (1976) (amended 2004) (stating
judges are elected through municipal elections); 3152(a)(3) (stating tenure of all
other Pennsylvania judges, including supreme court justices, is ten years).
235. See Jess Bravin, Chief Justice Roberts Rebuts Trump’s Attacks on Judges, and
President Tweets Back, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/chief-justice-rob
erts-rebuts-trumps-attacks-on-judges-1542827385 [permalink unavailable] (last updated Nov. 22, 2018, 11:10 PM) (highlighting dispute between President Trump
and Chief Justice Roberts of United States Supreme Court concerning federal
judges’ decisions criticized by President Trump’s ideology).
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court should continue to use historical analysis of King’s Bench to bolster
why it is warranted in certain situations.236
Notably, there is no structured or routine way for the court to invoke
King’s Bench.237 Decisions granting King’s Bench petitions serve as reminders of how compelled the court is to fulfill its oversight obligations.238 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania should continue to use
King’s Bench under proper circumstances if it is to maintain its status as
king of the commonwealth’s judiciary.
236. For further discussion of how the supreme court could utilize King’s
Bench, see supra Section IV.A.
237. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199, 1206 (Pa. 2015) (stating
King’s Bench needs no standardized form of procedure and is applicable when
supreme court finds appropriate circumstances). For a general discussion of past
situations that caused the supreme court’s invocation of King’s Bench, see supra
Part III.
238. See In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 675, 682–83 (Pa. 2014) (reiterating supreme court’s principal objectives in its oversight role and referring to list of examples supreme court used for justifying its King’s Bench powers). After listing
examples of situations resulting in the court exercising King’s Bench, the court
reaffirmed its use of King’s Bench serves to “guard the fairness and probity of the
judicial process.” Id.; see also Williams, 129 A.3d at 1206 (Pa. 2015) (submitting
King’s Bench is necessary to an efficient and effective judiciary system);
Carpentertown Coal and Coke Co. v. Laird, 61 A.2d 426, 428 (Pa. 1948) (asserting
one principal purpose for King’s Bench jurisdiction is to prevent inferior tribunals
from assuming unlawful jurisdiction).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss3/5

36

